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NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND




Trade and investment agreements provide the political, economic and legal
framework for economic integration m the modem international political economy,
and underscore the importance of international law in the integration process. The
proliferation of such agreements among nation-states since the mid-twentieth
century has been a major factor contributing to the increasing volume of business
transactions across borders. The Americas are certainly not an exception to these
trends. There are roughly fifty regional, sub-regional and bilateral trade and
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1. Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in 1948, now
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), there has been continued increase in the number of trade
agreements in the world. "At present, about 97% of total global trade involves countries that are
members of at least one PTA, compared with 72% in 1990. Asian Development Bank, Trends in Trade
and the Expanswn of PTAs, at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2002/pta0200.asp (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Trends in Trade"]. Notably, there was 22-fold increase in world
trade in merchandise from 1948 to 2000. World Bank, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001 at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/mmste/mm01_e/briefe/bnef2l_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2003) [hereinafter "Doha WTO"]. Aggregate world trade in goods in services in 1948 was $58 billion,
compared to $7.6 trillion in 2000. Id. In 2000, total world foreign direct investment flows reached
$1261 billion, which was 53-fold increase from 1973 when such investment totaled $24 billion. Id.
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") between countries
increased from 470 to nearly 2000, and some regional trade groupings such as NAFTA and the EU have
incorporated investment agreements into their broader trade agreements. Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only bit .and they could bite, (June 2003), at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143_wps312 l.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
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integration agreements m the Americas,2 with negotiations underway for other
agreements, including a Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA").3 In 2000,
total trade among FTAA negotiating countries had reached roughly $784 billion,
growing at 11% annually 4
Within the context of multilateral governance of trade and investment and
increasing transnational business transactions lies the following reality- more
transnational transactions mean an increasing need to seek effective, uniform
principles of dispute resolution for disputes between private parties and
governments arising out of a government's obligations under a trade agreement.
This is particularly true in the context of trade-related investment agreements,
through which private parties play a direct role in economic integration. 6 The role
of law in the modem international political economy is therefore paramount.
Several obstacles, however, often hinder or severely detract from efforts to
achieve uniformity of dispute resolution among foreign legal systems. The
greatest obstacle is the phenomenon of differing legal traditions. Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), namely arbitration, has emerged as the preferred
method of dispute resolution among nation-states belonging to trade agreements,
as well as among private parties engaged in international transactions.' Indeed, in
the context of international investment, private parties have long preferred
international arbitration for resolving investment disputes with foreign
governments.9
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")'0 is
unique among trade agreements in that it contains an entire chapter dealing with
foreign investment and the protection of such investment." Chapter II broadly
defines who an investor is and what an investment is in North America, and gives
2. See SICE, Inventory of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Procedures and Legal Texts
Established in Existing Trade and Integration Agreements, Treaties and Arrangements in the
Hemisphere and the WTO, at http://www.sice.oas.org/cpdisp/English/dsm toc.asp (last visited Feb.
23, 2003) [hereinafter "SICE, Inventory"].
3. See infra note 43.
4. Council of the Americas, Free Trade Area of the Americas, at http://www.amrencas-
society.org/coa/publications/testmony.AmbFrechette-9-9-02.htmi (last visited Feb. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter "Free Trade Area"].
5. See Hope H. Camp, Jr., Dispute Resolution and United States-Mexico Business Transactions,
5 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85 (1997); see Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the
NAFTA and the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP L. REv 1, 3, 11-12 (1998).
6. See Camp, supra note 5; see Gal-Or, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part ii.C.2.b (discussing various aspects of international alternative dispute
resolution).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, part 5, chapter 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
(effective Jan. 1, 1994), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 289, 296 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"]. The
Contracting Parties to NAFTA are Canada, the United Mexican States ("Mexico") and the United States
of America ("United States").
11. Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for Sovereignty, 24
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998) (pointing out that NAFTA is "the first comprehensive international trade
treaty to provide to private Parties direct access to dispute settlement as of right.").
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private investors in NAFTA Parties 12 direct access to binding international
arbitration for clatms against NAFTA Parties arismg out of investment disputes.
NAFTA thus seeks to bridge the gap between private individuals and governments
in the resolution of cross border commercial disputes. And, it does so by creating
an opportunity for a private investor to resolve an investment dispute without
litigating in foreign courts or pressuring the investor's home government to resolve
the dispute through diplomatic bargaining.13 The arbitration alternative is also a
pragmatic approach to the pressing need for effective international investment
dispute resolution without engaging in the monumentally difficult task of
harmonizing three different legal systems. 14 Chapter 11 dispute resolution is
indeed representative of the evolving link between international law, economics
and politics m the modem global political economy
Despite its pragmatism and progressive nature, however, Chapter II dispute
resolution has not escaped criticism. In recent years it has come under attack by
various groups and commentators in NAFTA Parties whose arguments are
generally based upon two main assertions: Chapter 11 dispute resolution is a threat
to national sovereignty and an abrogation of democracy s These critics base their
assertions on what they believe are fundamental flaws in the Chapter II dispute
resolution framework. The most often-cited arguments are that Chapter 11
promotes frivolous litigation and permits disproportionate compensation, lacks an
adequate award review process, uses "secret" tribunals to reduce transparency
prevents legitimate governmental regulation, and derogates from notions of
equality and sustainable development.1 6 In recent years, the literature on Chapter
II has increased as the general debate on its dispute resolution framework has
intensified.
The debate has centered primarily on whether Chapter 11 is detrmental to all
NAFTA Parties. A focus on Mexico, however, is particularly mtriguing given
Mexico's history toward foreign investment and its economic status relative to
Canada and the United States.' 7  Interestingly Chapter 11, for all intents and
purposes, runs counter to the traditional Mexican approach to international law and
foreign investment. That traditional approach emanates from conceptions of
international law and economic integration that are quite opposite from the
12. The text of NAFTA refers to Canada, Mexico and the United States as "Parties, therefore for
purposes of consistency I refer to NAFTA countries as NAFTA Parties and a NAFTA country
individually as NAFTA Party.
13. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back,
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43,44 (2001) [hereinafter "Brower I"].
14. Id.
15. See infra Part IV- Brower II, supra note 13, at 44 (noting that Chapter II "has become a
lightning rod for opponents of globalization and the intrusion of international law into domestic
affairs.").
16. See infra Part IV This is not an exhaustive list of the criticisms of Chapter II; however, it
does include the most often-cited arguments and thus the arguments that deserve most attention for
purposes of this article.
17 This is not to de-emphasize the implications of Chapter II on the United States and Canada.
That discussion is simply outside the scope of this article.
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philosophy behind NAFTA.' 8 Indeed, the traditional Mexican approach to
investment dispute resolution has customarily characterized a major line of
demarcation between developed and developing countries in an age of
globalization.
The inclusion of Chapter 11 in NAFTA, therefore, represents a major reversal
in policy for Mexico, and thus begs the question: is Chapter 11 direct access
dispute resolution beneficial to Mexico9 After all, of the NAFTA Parties it is
Mexico which has made the most dramatic changes in accepting Chapter 11 and
which is economically disadvantaged compared to its North American
counterparts. 19  Any detrimental aspects of Chapter 11 arguably would affect
Mexico the most. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to provide an informed
discussion of the criticisms of Chapter 11 dispute resolution and to evaluate the
implications of Chapter 1I for Mexico, focusing on the NAFTA text and the
Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico so far. First, however, this paper presents
important historical and policy foundations behind NAFTA in order to pave the
way for a discussion of Chapter 11 and Mexico.
Part II first provides a brief background on the history of economic
integration in the Americas. This part highlights the interrelationship of historical
political and economic policy interests pursued by the United States and Latin
America. Part II also includes an overview of the traditional Mexican approach to
foreign investment and international law Indeed, history tells why things are the
way they are now, and thus serves as an important backdrop for discussing the
purposes of NAFTA Chapter 11 and its implications for Mexico. Part II ends with
a detailed discussion of the background of NAFTA and its dispute resolution
framework, commenting briefly on the differing legal traditions of NAFTA Parties
and ADR in general. This discussion completes the task of providing the
necessary background information for proceeding to a more narrow discussion of
Chapter 11 and Mexico.
Part III discusses in detail Chapter 11. It first highlights the major substantive
provisions of Chapter 11, and then details its dispute resolution framework. This is
followed by summaries of the first four final arbitral awards involving Mexico.
2
0
This discussion sheds light on how the process has been handled in real-life
situations in Mexico and serves as a critical reference point for purposes of this
article.
Part IV moves to an informed discussion of the implications of Chapter 11 for
Mexico. It does so by taking into account the major criticisms of Chapter 11, and
then by responding to them using the Chapter 11 text and the first four final
arbitral awards against Mexico as the bases for testing those criticisms. The
criticisms discussed herein are by no means exhaustive. Rather, this article
18. See infra Part ii.B.I.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. At the time of this writing, pnvate investors have invoked the Chapter I I dispute resolution
mechanism against Mexico on nine occasions, and on roughly twenty occasions overall. This comment
is confined to discussion of the first four final arbitral awards issued involving Mexico.
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summarizes the most often-cited concerns with Chapter 11. This discussion
attempts to accomplish several things. It provides further clarity as to how and
why NAFTA Parties structured Chapter 11 as they did. It demonstrates why the
broader concerns with Chapter 11 are unfounded-why Chapter I1 is not a threat
to Mexico's sovereignty or democratic governance.
Further, and perhaps most importantly Part IV also sheds light on how
Chapter 11 is a unique example of how international law is a necessary and
positive force for Mexico in the governance of economic integration m North
America. As an extension of well-established principles of international law to
business activities between private individuals and governments, and as a novelty
in the ongomg trend of economic integration m the Americas, Chapter 11 direct
access dispute resolution is exemplary of what is necessary for Mexico's
successful participation in the international political economy
II. A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS
Globalization is the buzz word for describing the modem international
political economy Although specifically defining the phenomena of globalization
and when it precisely began tends to generate debate, it certainly implies "a
stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers.' In this
sense, economic integration-predominantly accomplished through trade and
investment agreements-is a key ingredient, a critical tool, of globalization.2 2 The
proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas over the last half century
demonstrates an unprecedented push by nation-states of varying wealth and size to
integrate their economies.23 This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in
NAFTA, where two countries with highly advanced economies, the United States
and Canada, entered into a free trade agreement with Mexico, a developing
country 2 4  The history behind NAFTA goes back much further than the early
1990s, however. Historical, political, and economic policy interests of both the
United States and Latin America as a whole set the background for understanding
21. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 15
(1999).
22. There are four basic levels of economic integration, which include (1) free trade area, (2)
customs union, (3) a common market, and (4) an economic union. See generally MICHAEL R.
CZINKOTA ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 256-57 (5 h ed. 1999). A free trade area is the least
integrative model, with focus on eliminating taxes, quotas, tariffs and other trade barriers among
member countries without forming collective policy for relations with nonmembers. See id. In a
customs union, on the other hand, members not only agree to eliminate trade barriers, they also agree to
common trade policy regarding nonmembers. Id. A common market goes step further, as it
incorporates the tenets of a customs union but seeks to integrate further the factors of production-
labor, capital and technology-thus eliminating restrictions mainly in the areas of immigration and
investment. Id. Lastly, "the creation of true economic union requires integration of economic policies
in addition to the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production across borders. Id. A
common monetary and tax policy as well as a common currency among members further characterize
an economic union. Id.
23. See supra notes 1-3.
24. Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18.
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NAFTA and the intended purposes and implications of its provisions.
A. US. Policy and the Economics of Latin America
As Latin America and the Caribbean gamed their independence from
European colonial powers in the first part of the nineteenth century, the United
States faced a critical foreign policy decision: what would be U.S. foreign policy in
a Western Hemisphere of independent countries? 25 The answer to this question,
along with economic trends m Latin America over the last two centuries, helps
explain the policy behind modem economic integration. In 1822, the United States
was the first country officially to recognize Argentina (then La Plata), Chile, Peru,
Colombia and Mexico as new countries. 26 In 1823, President Monroe and
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams fashioned the historic Monroe Doctrine,
which has served as the crux of United States foreign policy in the region ever
since.
27
In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt referred to the Monroe Doctrine as "a
guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas. 28 At the time, there
was brewing tension between European countries and Latin American countries,
particularly Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, arising out of the failure to
repay public debts to European lenders.29  In 1904, President Roosevelt,
anticipating possible military action by European countries, officially reaffirmed
U.S. commitment to intervene against any foreign power that attacked any Latin
American nation, regardless of any general reluctance of the United States to
become engaged m such a military entanglement.3 0  This became known as the
Roosevelt Corollary. 1 Subsequent U.S. presidents acted to strengthen the precepts
of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. For example, President Taft
championed Dollar Diplomacy m Latin America, 2 and President Wilson used
25. See SAMUEL F BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY (1940); see ARTHUR P WHITAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN
AMERICA, 1800-1830 (1941).
26. ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 282 (10th ed. 1999).
27. Id. The Monroe Doctrine "established the idea of American hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere that later U.S. governments would invoke at will to justify policies in Latin America. Id.
The Monroe Doctrine had two major themes: (1) the United States would not tolerate any future
European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, and (2) the United States would regard any attack
on an American nation as an attack upon the United States, and would respond with force against any
country or countries initiating such an attack. The Monroe Doctrine was primarily political doctrine;
however, it also furthered United States economic interests in Latin America by stopping European
colonization and the impenal, protectionist economic policies that accompanied such colonization. Id.
28. THOMAS G. PATERSON ET AL., I AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: A HISTORY TO 1920 243
(5th ed. 2000).
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 243. Dollar Diplomacy included "using private financiers and business leaders to
promote foreign policy, and using diplomacy to promote American commerce and investment abroad.
Id. at 240. Indeed, "[e]xports to Latin America increased markedly from $132 million at the turn of the
century to $309 million in 1914. Id. at 240.
VOL. 32:3
NAFTA CHAPTER I I DISPUTE RESOLUTION & MEXICO
military force to quiet internal conflicts m the region and safeguard U.S.
commercial interests.33
World Wars and the Great Depression in the first part of the twentieth century
curtailed U.S. involvement in Latin American affairs.3 4 In fact, the economic
effects of these events shocked Latin American economies and set the stage for
major economic policy changes in the region.35 Prior to the mid-twentieth century,
Latin American countries had followed an export-oriented economic model based
mostly on primary product exports.36 This served U.S. needs and commercial
interests, but left Latin American economies at the mercy of international demand
fluctuations.37 As industrialized countries erected trade barriers to recover from
the Depression, Latin American countries experienced serious decreases in export
income which caused severe economic setbacks.38
During World War II, Latin American countries experienced increased export
income from the increased demand for food stuffs, but wartime industrial
production and consumption limited the availability of much needed industrial
imports to Latin American countries. 39 These events stirred nationalistic rhetoric
in many large Latin American countries, and led to the emergence of political
populism, which called for protectionist economic policies geared toward boosting
internal development.40 By the 1940s, policymakers in Latin America, deriving
theoretical support from the tenets of dependency theory and economic
structuralism, implemented inward-looking, protectionist polices that lasted
through the 1970s, known mainly as import substitution industrialization (,,ISI).4
1
33. Id. at 245.
34. FREDERICK S. WEAVER, LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 121 (2000).
35. Id. at 117-121.
36. Id.
37. Id., PATRICE FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 46-47
(1999); Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18 at 129-30.
38. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 46-47.
39. WEAVER, supra note 35, at 121.
40. Id. at 121-25, 137.
41. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 52-55. With regard to dependency theory, Franko comments:
Proponents of dependency theory postulated that a country did not thrive or falter simply
because of its own national endowments. Rather, progress could be attributed to the
power it had to set the rules of the international economic game. Center countries, or the
industrialized countries, defined the rules; the periphery, or developing countries, were
pawns in the international pursuit of profit.
Id. at53.
This led to the emergence of the structuralist school of economic development, headed by Rail
Prebisch, an Argentinean economist who became chair of the United Nations Economic Commlssion
for Latin America ("ECLA") in 1949. Id. 53-54. Franko notes:
Under the leadership of Rafil Prebisch, ECLA analysts looked at the disappointing
economic performance of Latin America in the first half of the century, focusing on the
volatility of primary product exports, and the progressive difficulty of paying for more
technologically sophisticated (and expensive) products with the limited agricultural
returns. Technological progress was controlled by the powerful center-industrialized
countries and spread slowly into the periphery. ECLA researchers in the 1950s were
also fascinated by seeming correlation between the interruption of normal trade
patterns with the industrialized countries during war periods and accompanying robust
2004
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Cold War politics prompted the United States to promote some economic
cooperation with Latin American countries, despite the latters' protectionist
policies.4 2  For example, in 1961, President Kennedy initiated the Alliance for
internal growth in the Latin Amenca regions. Isolation from the international system
apparently helped growth at home.
In part the disadvantaged position of the penphery countries in the international system
derived from the kind of goods they offered. Developing countries principally traded
primary products, such as raw materials and agricultural goods, for more technologically
advanced products in the international arena. Within this unequal framework, they faced
what was seen as declining terms of trade for their products. There are only so many
bananas that people want to eat or so much coffee that they can dnnk. Given the low
income elasticity for agricultural products, as the global economy grows, the relative
demand for primary products declines. Instead, rewards tend to accrue to those engaged
in technological entrepreneurship. Technological sophistication adds value to good,
increasing its market pnice well beyond the cost of basic inputs. Declining terms of trade
for primary products reflected the argument that as the prices of sophisticated goods
rose, developing countries would need to export more and more oranges or wheat to pay
for the more expensive technological machinery. Without mastering technology,
countnes had little hope of advancement.
Id. at 53-55.
The prescription, therefore, according to the structuralists, was for Latin American governments to play
a prominent role in regulating trade and focusing on acquiring technology and improving industrial
capacity. Protectionism and high tariff rates thus swept across Latin America, where "[alverage
nominal protection over consumer and manufactured goods was 131 percent in Argentina, 168 percent
in Brazil, 138 percent in Chile, 112 percent in Colombia, 61 percent in Mexico, and 21 percent in
Uruguay in 1960. Id. at 59. Governments also overvalued exchange rates to promote cheaper imports
and promulgated monetary and fiscal policies that included subsidizing domestic enterprises through
nationalized lending institutions, while also providing such enterprises with tax credits and special
interest rates. Id. at 60-62. These protectionist policies, ironically, had the effect of stimulating foreign
investment in manufactunng in many Latin American countries because multinational corporations
found it profitable to establish a presence in those countries rather than deal with protectionist trade
policies. Id. at 62-64. "In or about 1970, 24 percent of manufacturing in Argentina, 50 percent in
Brazil, 30 percent in Chile, 43 percent in Colombia, 35 percent in Mexico, 44 percent in Peru and 14
percent in Venezuela was under foreign control. Id. at 62; see also MICHAEL C. MEYER ET AL., THE
COURSE OF MExicAN HISTORY 611-614 (6th ed. 1999) (discussing the trends and implications of
industrialization policies in Mexico in the mid-twentieth century). During ISI, Latin American
countres experienced high growth rates and significant industrialization, but the negative effects of ISI
became apparent in the 1970s and 80s. See FRANKO, supra note 38, at 64-8. (discussing numerous
negative effects of ISI on Latin American economies, including high deficits and inflation, balance-of-
payment crises, debt accumulation,the rise of politically oppressive military regimes and government
corruption, to name a few); see also WEAVER, supra note 35, at 169-79 (discussing the demise of ISI
and subsequent debt cnses in Latin America). Nonetheless, the gradual abandonment of ISI policies in
Latin America set the stage for a new discussion of economic integration efforts between Latin America
and the United States.
42. In July of 1947, George Kerman, then director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S.
Department of State and formerly a U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, issued his famous
"Memorandum X" which advocated for U.S. policy of containment of the spread of Soviet
communism. See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 244-45. Coinciding with that policy, U.S. politicians
began speculating that if one country in region fell to communism, the entire region would fall, and
then eventually the rest of the world, which became known as the "domino theory. Id. at 254-57.
Kennan's policy recommendation dominated the U.S. foreign policy mindset throughout the Cold War.
Id. Consequently, any hint of communism in Latin America encouraged U.S. policymakers to take
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Progress through the Organization of American States ("OAS"). 4 3  Kennedy
"envisioned spending $20 billion in funds from the U.S. and international
organizations" to promote economic development in Latin America." The
Alliance for Progress was rather unsuccessful in achieving its goals for economic
development, but it did symbolize U.S. commitment to preserving its interests in
Latin America-a further extension of the Monroe Doctrine, over one hundred
years later.45
In the 1980s, the U.S. began to focus on the vital connection between
democracy and economic integration in Latin America. One commentator notes
that, "despite selective unevenness and all the other caveats, there still was a
significant sea change in U.S. policy in the 1980s: U.S. governments actively
encouraged transitions from military to electoral regimes m South and Central
America and pressured Mexico to clean up its electoral act."46 Specifically, in
response to communist revolutions in Central America, President Reagan instituted
the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"). 47 As one commentator describes,
[Tihe CBI stressed the need for economic development and the development
of free enterprise in the region as a means of combatting communist
expansionism. Twenty Caribbean basin countries were designated as the
beneficiaries of a program that included a combination of foreign aid, investment
incentives, and reduction of barriers to United States markets. This included
twelve years of duty-free access to United States markets for most exports from
designated countries and industries.
4
8
With the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration faced the task of
developing a new U.S. foreign policy model for Latin America. One author
summarizes that "[t]he Bush administration joined most Latin American states in
adopting a primarily economic foundation for mter-Amencan relationships, with
agreement on the essentiality of continued democratic development.,, 49 In 1990,
President Bush announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative ("EAI"),
action to dispel such political change. Id.
43. See id. at 331.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 332. The Alliance for Progress did not prove to be an economic success for variety
of reasons, some of which included lack of U.S. investor initiative, corruption in Latin American
politics, and the rise of military regimes in Latin America. Id. Nonetheless, it did achieve some
political success in rallying pro-Amencan, as opposed to Soviet, support in Latin America. See, for
example, ANTONIO H. OBAID & NINO MARITANO, AN ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: THE CHALLENGE AND
THE PROBLEM 11 (1963), writing in the first few years after its inception that "it deserves full credit for
the noticeable improvement which is taking place m the political atmosphere The anti-American
feelings prevalent in the 1950's have subsided considerably There is much admiration, respect,
and affection for this country.
46. WEAVER, supra note 35, at 186. This set the groundwork for future negotiations regarding
economic integration under the George H.W Bush Administration. See supra notes 39-41.
47 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).
48. Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles under
NAFTA-Based System, 36 HAR. INT'L L.J. 127, 149 (1995) (internal footnotes omitted).
49. G. POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 130 (3d ed.,
Westview Press 1995).
2004
DENv J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
which served to spearhead U.S. negotiations for free trade, increased investment
and debt relief in the Western Hemisphere as well as to ignite the modem process
of economic integration.50 Indeed, negotiations for NAFTA arose in the context of
the EAIs
The Clinton Administration continued the push for free trade in the Americas.
In fact, "[t]he Clinton Administration's economic policy toward Latin America
[was] largely a continuation of President Bush's EAI. '52 Not only was President
Clinton successful in getting NAFTA in place, but his efforts also led several
countries m the Western Hemisphere to meet and officially declare their mutual
goal of achieving hemispheric free trade through an FTAA 3 The current
administration has reaffirmed U.S. commitment to free trade and increased
economic integration in the Americas. A free trade agreement with Chile entered
into force at the beginning of this year.54 Most recently, the United States and
50. George Bush, Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1009 (June 27, 1990). O'Hop, supra note 49, at 149 (commenting that "[tihe three
pillars of this initiative were: (1) reduction of trade barriers, (2) increase of investment into the region,
and (3) debt relief," which led the U.S. to actively pursue bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed
at liberalizing trade with countries in the Amencas.). Id. at 150 ("The EAI encouraged rapid
development of subregional associations.").
51. O'Hop, supra note 49 at 149.
52. Id. at 151.
53. See id. In December of 1994, thirty four democratic countries in the Americas met in Miami,
Flonda at the Summit of the Americas, with the goal of fashioning the FTAA. Antecedents of the FTAA
Process, at http://www.ftaa-alca.orgfView e.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "FTAA
Website"] and Summit of the Americas Information Network, at http://www.summit-americas.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Summit of Americas Website"]. "The idea behind the FTAA is
the consolidation of the nearly twenty-five free trade pacts already operating in region of nearly 800
million inhabitants. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 241 Since the Miami Summit, summits have taken
place in San Jose (1996), Santiago (1998) and Quebec City (2001). Summit of Amencas Website,
supra. The FTAA would serve as an enormous regional trade agreement, creating "a market of
[over] 719 million people and could expand trade within the hemisphere to unprecedented levels.
Richard L. Bemal, Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and Promise of Fair vs. Free Trade, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 946 (1996). The Second Draft of the Consolidated Text of the FTAA is
available at the official website for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"),
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml (last visited Mar 2, 2004) [hereinafter "Draft
FTAA"].
Through the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, negotiating states have agreed to
make decisions on a consensus basis, to ensure that the decision-making process is transparent, to
follow WTO-based guidelines, to take into account the needs of less-developed countries, and to
complete negotiations for the FTAA by 2005. Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 1.L.M.
808 (1995) [hereinafter "FTAA Declaration"]; FTAA Website, supra. The Declaration also expresses
the negotiating states' commitment to "build on existing subregional and bilateral agreements in order
to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements together. FTAA
Declaration, supra, at 811. For detailed discussions on the FTAA, dispute resolution and economic
integration, see Frank J. Garcia, Americas Agreements"--An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997), Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers in
International Trade: Decsionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas:
An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997), and David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
under Free Trade Area of the Americas, 28 U. MiAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 597 (1997).
The implications of NAFTA Chapter II direct access dispute resolution on the FTAA is also
an important and interesting topic, however, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
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several Central American countries signed the Central American Free Trade
Agreement ("CFTA"). 5' In addition, the United States has continued to sign and
negotiate bilateral investment treaties with Latin American countries
5 6
B. Latin America and the Emergence of Trade and Investment Agreements
In 1948, as ISI policies began to emerge in Latin America,57 another
economic trend took hold. Despite encouraging protectionist economic policies as
a means to achieve internal growth, the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America ("ECLA") actually encouraged trade cooperation between Latin
American countries in the form of regional trading blocs. 58 The result was the
formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association ("LAFTA") in 1960, 59
which evolved into the Latin American Integration Association ("LAIA") m
1980.60 The second half of the twentieth century also witnessed the emergence of
various subregional trade agreements in Latin America, including the Central
American Common Market ("CACM") in 1960,61 the Andean Community in
1969,62 the Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") in 1973,63 and the Mercado del
54. For discussion of the negotiations, the signing and the text of the Chile-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, see the official website for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/chile.htm (ast visited Mar. 9, 2004). See also Scott R. Jablonski, iSi Po,
Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution Does Have a Place in Trade Agreements in the Americas:
Chapter 10 of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, __ U. MIAMI INTER. AM. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2004).
55. USTR, "U.S. & Central American Countries Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement, at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/12/03-82.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2003). The Central American
countries are Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica Id.
56. Jame R. Holbein & Gary Carpnticr, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 567-569 (1993). The
authors note that "pursuant to EAI, the U.S. has signed seventeen framework agreements on trade and
investment. Id. at 567 These framework agreements provide the foundation for negotiations of
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") between the United States and Latin American countries. See id.
at 568-69.
57. See supra note 29.
58. O'Hop, supra note 49, at 133.
59. Treaty Establishing a Latin American Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, 1484 U.N.T.S. 223 (1960); O'Hop, supra note 49, at 131.
60. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12,
1980, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 672 (1980). "The long range objective of this process shall be the gradual
and progressive formation of a Latin American common market. Id. at 673. The eleven original
signatory countries to LAIA include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Cuba became the twelfth member in 1999. ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES, TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 118-21 (Jose M. Salazar-Xinnachs &
Maryse Robert eds., 2001) [hereinafter "OAS FREE TRADE"] (discussing LAIA in detail) and Atkins,
supra note 50, at 189-90 (commenting that LAIA provides Latin American countries with political
forum for trade negotiations on many levels, including the promotion of developing strong market-
based economies, special treatment for less-developed countries and participation by nonmember
countries and private parties in some instances).
61. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/tradeagreements/CACM.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004).
62. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 910
(1969).
63. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 17, reprinted in 12
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Cono Sur ("MERCOSUR")6 m 1991. Through the OAS, Latin American
countries have discussed and continue to discuss all aspects of integration,
including the harmonization of private international law and other cooperation
65conducive to economic integration. Moreover, Latin American countries have
been responsive to ongoing negotiations for the FTAA.66
In addition, with regard to foreign investment, "[c]ountnes m Latin America
and the Caribbean have signed approximately three hundred BITs, virtually all of
which were negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s.,,67 As discussed below, the
Mexican approach to economic integration traditionally had been more limited
compared to other Latin American countries. Mexico's policy on the interplay
between international law and foreign investment did, however, influence foreign
investment policies throughout Latin America prior to the 1980s. 68 Those policies
stood in stark contrast to U.S. policy initiatives. Until the negotiation of NAFTA
became a reality Mexico stood firm in its opposition to international standards for
foreign investment dispute resolution.
1. The Traditional Mexican Approach to Foreign Investment
The international-based, investor-friendly provisions found in Chapter 11 and
discussed m detail later run counter to traditional Mexican law regarding foreign
mvestment. 69 It has been noted that "[s]ince the nineteenth century, Mexico has
contested vehemently the traditional principles of international law governing the
protection of foreigners and foreign property ,70 This policy originated from
Mexican dissatisfaction with foreign investors at the end of the nineteenth
I.L.M. 1033 (1973).
64. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Apr. 19, 1991, reprinted in 30 i.L.M. 1041 (1991).
65. O'Hop, supra note 49, at 135-37. The OAS sponsors talks for hemispheric legal
harmonization through its Inter-American Specialized Conferences on Private International Law
(known as "CIDIPs"). Organization of American States, at http://www.oas.org/dil/
privateintlaw interamencanconferences.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter "OAS Website"].
There have been six CIDIPs to date, covering topics such as junsdiction, enforcement ofjudgments and
secured financial transactions, to name a few. Id.
66. See supra note 54.
67. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade Hearing on
the Outcome of the Summit of the Americas and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemisphere, 27 CAN.
U.S. L.J. 313, 18 (2001) (testimony of Daniel M. Price on behalf of the U.S. Council for International
Business).
68. Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 323 (1994); Daniel R. Lontz,
Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under
NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COmp. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2000).
69. Indeed, NAFTA "represents the first time Mexico has entered into an international agreement
providing for investor-state arbitration. Daniel M. Pnce, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter- Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW 727 (1993) (no
pagination electronic version) [hereinafter "Price, Overview"].
70. See NAFTA: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 24-8 (Ralph H. Folsom, Michael Wallace
Gordon, & David Lopez eds., 2000) [hereinafter "NAFTA COURSEBOOK"]. See also Loritz, supra note
69, at 536 (noting Mexico's history of expropriation of foreign investment without compensation).
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century 71 For example, the open investment policy of President Porfino Diaz m
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was a major contributor to
economic and social problems in Mexico, and consequently a significant cause of
the Revolution.72 The view in Mexico that foreign investment was a threat to state
sovereignty and Mexico's economic well-being remained pervasive throughout
most of the twentieth century 71
Developed countries, on the other hand, traditionally have argued it is a basic
principle of international law that a country must provide an investor with just
compensation in the event that a country expropriated an mvestment. 74 Indeed, the
view advocated by the United States and other developed countries 75 was in stark
contrast to that which developing countries, like Mexico, espoused:
At the end of the 1970s, the world remained sharply divided in its view of
international investment policy, particularly the issue of compensation for
expropriation. The developed states asserted that expropriation required payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The socialist states contended
that no compensation was required, although they frequently did agree to pay
compensation in settlement of claims by expropriated foreign investors. The
developing states also rejected the prompt, adequate and effective standard,
generally taking the position that the calculation of compensation should depend
upon a variety of factors, such as the return that the investor already had received
71. See NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 26.
72. Sandrno, supra note 69, at 279-81. The author explains:
Although actual figures are not available, recent studies suggest that by the end of
Porfinato, foreigners owned over half of the total wealth of Mexico and foreign capital
dominated most areas of productive enterprise.
The presence of foreign investors during the Porfinato was largely to blame for many of
Mexico's economic ills at the beginning of this century and fueled the Mexican
Revolution of 1910. The Revolution established the ideological and political foundation
for a fundamentally different state role in the Mexican economy. The new boundaries
for the role of the Mexican state were established in the Mexican Constitution of 1917,
which placed restraints on foreign economic activities and foreign land ownership. By
incorporating the anti-foreign sentiments of the Mexican revolutionaries, the Mexican
Constitution emphasized Mexican sovereignty and independence from foreign economic
control.
Id. at 280-81; see also Loritz, supra note 69, at 535-36.
73. Sandrino, supra note 69, at 279-81.
74. See generally John A. Westberg, International Transactions and Claims Involving
Government Parties: Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 219 (1991) (discussing the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 15 (1987), explaining that
"compensation in the case of expropriation or nationalization [must] be 'appropriate' and 'just' which
means it must be in 'an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken' which means 'fair market
value' where that can be determined."); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the
International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998) (discussing the diffenng views on
international law and investment among developed and developing countries.).
75. Sandnno, supra note 69, at 265 ("Since the end of the nineteenth century, the developed states
have been preoccupied with securing international standards for the protection of investments of their
nationals and firms abroad, fashioned on the traditional rules of the protection of property.").
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pnor to the expropnation and the content of local law on the subject.76
The principle that local law should govern foreign investment disputes thus
traditionally has been the centerpiece of Mexican policy on the issue.
The Mexican Constitution accomplishes this policy in what is known as the
"Calvo Clause." 77 In the mid-nmeteenth century, the Argentinean diplomat and
publicist Carlos Calvo set forth a series of "assertions" that formed the basis of
what became known as the Calvo Doctrine.78 Calvo argued that international law
and principles of state sovereignty prohibited diplomatic and military intervention
by foreign countries to resolve commercial disputes on behalf of their investors.
79
Such intervention exacerbated the inequality between developed and developing
countries by obliging developing countries to give foreigners more protection in
commercial dealings than was given to their own citizens.80 The Calvo Doctrine,
therefore, is based on two key principles: absolute "nonintervention" by foreign
states and "absolute equality of foreigners with nationals" with regard to
foreigners' commercial dealings in another country 8'
The Calvo Doctrine became immediately popular throughout Latin America.
8 2
Latin American countries for years tried to implement the Calvo Doctrine through
international treaties, in national constitutions and in municipal legislation, but the
most popular and successful approach has been to implement Calvo's principles
through contractual stipulation. 3 Calvo's principles are still pervasive in many
Latin American countries today and stand as a point of contention between
developed and developing countries." In Mexico, the Constitution provides:
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican corporations have the right
to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and the appurtenances, or to obtain
76. Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 385-86. Dunng the 1970s this divide was evidenced in the
United Nations system, wherein a number of developing and less-developed countries formed the New
International Economic Order ("NIEO") in an attempt to assert more control over an international
system which those countries viewed as exploitative to their interests and oppressive to their aspirations
for development. Sandrino, supra note 69, at 269-76. In fact, one of the main aspects of the NIEO was
to "challenge[] traditional principles of customary international law that govern foreign direct
investment, such as determining compensation for expropriation or nationalization and settling foreign
investment disputes. Id. at 274.
Interestingly, as result of the NIEO movement in the United Nations, a series of resolutions
were passed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1970s that outright rejected principles of
customary international law regarding foreign investment disputes. See RONALD A. BRAND,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 983-93 (Kluwer Law International
2000) [hereinafter "BRAND IBT"].
77. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Umdos Mexicanos, art. 27 (1976),
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/l1917const.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
78. DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17 (1955).
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 18-19.
81. Id. at 19-20.
82. Id. at21.
83. Id. at 21-32.
84. Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 161, 168-69 (1996).
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concessions for working mines or for the utilization of waters or mineral fuel in
the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same rights to aliens, provided
they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves
Mexicans in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the
protection of their governments in matters relating thereto, under penalty, in the
case of noncompliance, of forfeiture of the property so acquired.
85
Thus, for most of the twentieth century, the Mexican approach to foreign
investment disputes was to handle such disputes according to national law,
disregarding any "international" standards for foreign investment dispute
resolution. Since the NAFTA negotiating process began, however, Mexican policy
has undergone significant changes-namely, the Calvo Clause no longer applies to
investors from NAFTA Parties.8 6  Moreover, the Mexican legal system has
undergone much reform over the last two decades, paving the way for the
application of international law in Mexican courts, comportmg with Mexico's
goals for economic openness and development8 7
85. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Umdos Mexicanos (1976),
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/does/1917consthtm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). See also NAFTA
CoutRsEBooK, supra note 71, at 324 (noting that the Cavo Clause "stipulate[d] that foreign persons
operating in Mexico should be considered in all respects as Mexicans, thus limiting the resolution of
disputes to local courts adjudicating under domestic law provisions and prohibiting any intervention by
the home government."); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing
the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 193-95 (2001) (discussing
the history of Mexico's unfriendly foreign investor provisions and explaining that "the United States
lobbied hard to include Chapter I l's investment protections precisely because it wanted 'to liberalize
Mexican restrictions on investment' ") (internal footnotes omitted). See Sandrmo, supra note 69, at
283-87, for a good discussion of how the traditional anti-foreign investment sentiment in Mexico is
embedded in the Mexican Constitution and in Mexican law.
86. Isidro Morales, NAFTA: The Governance of Economic Openness, 565 ANNALS 35, 50 (1999)
(internal citations omitted), explaining that the traditional Mexican approach:
was completely opposed to the international minimum standard that the U.S. government
has traditionally required all states to comply with when dealing with foreign
investments. According to the U.S. view, even if state does not provide its own
nationals with minimum international rights, it may not escape international
responsibility to guarantee minimum standards to nationals of other countries. Though
Latin American countries, including Mexico, have moved progressively from the
national-centered paradigm to that of the "minimum international standard" approach,
chapter II of NAFTA is a turning point in this regard.
87. See generally Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Mexico, 5
U.S.-MEx. L.J. 137, 140 (1997) (discussing the significant changes in Mexican laws in recent years,
notig that "[f]or over half century, Mexico's absolute temtonalism led to the virtual exclusion of
foreign law from that country's court system" and that "[flrom 1932 to 1988, over fifty years, Mexico
was so territonalistic that no foreign judgments were enforced in Mexico."); Jorge Cicero, International
Law in Mexican Courts, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1035 (1997) (discussing the progressive evolution
of international law in the Mexican legal system); Miguel Jauregui Rojas, A New Era: The Regulation
of Investment in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 41 (1993) (discussing the changes in law in Mexico in the
1980s regarding foreign investment, such as reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic
enterprises, in order to comply more with international practices and enhance foreign investment in
Mexico); Sandnno, supra note 69, at 301-07 (discussing in detail the changing regulatory scheme of
foreign mvestment in Mexico in the latter part of the twentieth century).
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C NAFTA
The idea that modern trade and investment agreements provide the framework
for economic integration in the Western Hemisphere, as discussed, has foundations
m U.S. political and economic interests beginning in the nineteenth century as well
as in efforts at economic integration by Latin American countries since the mid-
twentieth century. The current reality is, nevertheless, clear: globalization has
finally linked historical political agendas and economic trends in the Americas and
countries are seeking structured, legal frameworks within which to control trends
m economic integration. It is within this historical context that NAFTA emerged
as the first official milestone m economic integration m the Americas-the first
official trade agreement between developed countries and a developing country 88
1. Background
Canada, Mexico and the United States began negotiations for a free trade area
in North America in 1991, largely on account of President Bush's EAI.89 The
United States and Canada were already parties to a free trade agreement, the U.S.
Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA"), 90 and the United States led the charge
toward creating a new free trade agreement for all of North America.9I In fact, in
the early 1990s, the United States began to experience increasing economic
competition from a more unified European Community, and it was feared that if
the United States did not act to stimulate more economic cooperation in the
Western Hemisphere, a strong Europe may gain an advantage in Latin American
markets.92 Thus, for President Bush, NAFTA served as a critical maneuver to
counter economic competition in Latin America from an integrating Europe, as
well as a first step toward hemispheric integration. For President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari of Mexico, NAFTA represented a great opportunity to stimulate the
Mexican economy and effectively assure that Mexico could not return to its
protectionist policies of the past.93
Indeed, President Salinas had engineered tremendous fiscal and economic
policy reform in Mexico since his term began in 1988, making negotiations for
NAFTA with the United States and Canada possible m the first place. 94 Both
President Salinas and his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo, were responsible for
opening Mexico's economy in preparation for NAFTA by privatizing state
88. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 228; Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18, at 130 ("NAFTA is the only
example so far of scheme of economic integration involving two advanced economies and one
emerging or developing economy."); Sandrino, supra note 69, at 261-62 (noting that NAFTA "is the
first regional trade pact between Third World state and two industrialized states.").
89. See supra notes 39-42.
90. Dec. 22, 1987, U.S.-Can. (effective Jan. 2, 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
91. RALPH FOLSOM & W DAvis FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS 119 (1996) [hereinafter "FOLSOM & FOLSOM"].
92. See Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18, at 93.
93. See MEYER, supra note 42, at 670-73.
94. See id.
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enterprises, reducing government spending and transforming the Mexican
economy into a free market economy 9' The three countries signed NAFTA in
1993, and after President Clinton spearheaded negotiations for side agreements on
labor and the environment, the U.S. Congress passed NAFTA marking the
beginning of a truly historic cooperative. % Under the direction of President
Zedillo, Mexico continued to liberalize its economy throughout the 1990s m
inplementmg NAFTA. 9 7  Interestingly, because of Chile's stable political and
economic climate, NAFTA countries met with Chile on five occasions to discuss
Chile's accession to NAFTA.98 However, Chile suspended talks regarding its
accession, waiting for the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track negotiating authority
for President Clinton, which never happened.99
Although some commentators opine that "the jury is still out on the effects of
NAFTA," ° trade has increased dramatically among NAFTA Parties since the
agreement took effect, and Parties continue to hold meetings to accelerate the
elimination of all tariffs and non-tariff barrers to trade in North America.' ° l In
terms of stimulating trade and foreign investment, NAFTA has been a positive tool
for Mexican economic policy i02 Ten years after NAFTA went into effect North
American trade has doubled. 10 3  Mexican exports to the United States have
increased by 234% and by 203% to Canada.' 4 Increased exports have generated
new jobs for Mexican workers (one out of five jobs are export-oriented), which
pay on average 37% more than manufacturing jobs in Mexico.'0 5 Mexico also
continues to receive large amounts of foreign investment from its NAFTA partners




95. NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 28.
96. See FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 120-21 (1999); Dr. Elvia Acelia Quintana Adriano,
The North American Free Trade Agreement and Its Impact on the Micro- Small- and Medium-Sized
Mexican Industries, 39 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 967 (1995) (explaining that NAFTA created "the largest free
trade area in the world.").
97. See NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 28.
98. Id. at 746.
99. Id. at 746-47 Thereafter, Chile has entered into free trade agreements with Canada and
Mexico. OAS FREE TRADE, supra note 61, at 103-104. And, in June 2003, the United States and Chile
signed free trade agreement. USTR, Chile Free Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fla/
chile.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
100. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 232.
101. See OAS FREE TRADE, supra note 61, at 89.
102. Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank says NAFTA Has Had Positive Impact On Mexico, U.N.
Wire, Dec. 18, 2003, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20031218/449_11452.asp (last visited May 1,
2004).
103. See United States Trade Representative, "NAFTA at Ten: A Success Story, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/2003-12-08-naftalO-factsheet.pdf (last visited April 7, 2004).
104. See United States Trade Representative, "NAFTA. A Decade of Strengthening a Dynamic
Relationship, at htp://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafia2003/brochure-english.pdf (last visited
April 7,2004).
105. See United States Trade Representative, "Myth: NAFTA was a Failure for Mexico, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa2003/factsheet-myth-nafta-mexico.pdf (last visited April
7, 2004).
106. See U.S. Embassy in Mexico, "North American Free Trade Agreement: Tenth Anniversary,
at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eNAFTA figures.him (last visited April 7, 2004) (graphing FDI
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Mexico is now receiving three times the amount of capital inflow it received
in the five-year period immediately prior to NAFTA. 0 7 Moreover, Mexico has
"become the third highest recipient of foreign direct investment ("FDI") among
developing countries."' l8 FDI-related jobs in Mexico have grown twice as fast as
other jobs in Mexico and pay on average some 50% more than national average
wages. 1 9 Notably, Mexico has signed free trade agreements with several Central
American countries, has joined the Group of Three with Colombia and Venezuela
establishing a free trade area with those countries, and also has free trade
agreements with Bolivia and Chile." 0
NAFTA itself is a highly technical trade document. It lacks, however, the
institutional framework that characterizes the more progressive European Union,
for example."' NAFTA is, at base, a free trade agreement between the Parties,
with no provisions for additional party accession and no schedules for achieving
higher forms of economic integration such as a customs union, common market or
economic union. 1 2 It does, however, cover a wide range of trade-related topics,
in Mexico by sector).
107. See OECD Global Forum on International Investment, "New Horizons and Policy Changes for
Foreign Direct Investment in the 21 Century, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/52/2424050.pdf
(last visited April 7,2004) [hereinafter "OECD Global Forum"].
108. See id; see also Secretana de Economia de Mdxico, Comisi6n Nacional de Inversiones
Extranjers, "Informe Estadistico Sobre el Comportamiento de la Inversi6n Extranjera Directa en
Mdxico (Enero - diciembre de 2003), at http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p1175/03-dic.doc (last
visited April 7, 2004). That report, which covers foreign investment statistics in Mexico from January
2003 to December 2003, points out a 24.7% estimation of new investment in Mexico. Id. (translation
mine) ("la estimaci6n de la IED realizada en el lapso enero diciembre de 2003 asciende 10,731.4
md, y se integra en un 24.7% (2651.0 md) de nuevas inversiones "). It also notes that dunng that
time period 54.1% of total foreign investment came from the United States. Id. (graphing foreign
investment inflows by country). Statistics regarding foreign investment from U.S. businesses are
particularly staggering. In fact, "[in] September of 2002 there were 15,356 businesses with U.S. capital,
which is 55.0% of all businesses with foreign direct investment (FDI) registered in Mexico (27,936).
Secretaria de Economia, Subsecretana de Normatividad, Inversi6n Extranjera y Practicas Comerciales
Intemacionales, "Direcci6n General de Inversi6n Extranjera: Inversi6n de Estados Umdos en Mdxico,
at http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/pl240/EUASEP03.doc (last visited April 7, 2004) (translation
mine) ("Al mes de septiembre de 2003 se cuenta con un registro 15,356 sociedades con participaci6n
estadounidense en su capital social, esto es, el 55 .0 %o del total de sociedades con inversion extranjera
directa (IED) registradas en Mdxjco (27,936)."). Further, "[bletween January 1999 and September
2003, businesses with U.S. capital realized $51,903.7 million, which represents 68.0/c of all FDI
invested in the country during that time ($76,286.5 million) "). Id. (translation mine) ("Entre enero
de 1999 y septiembre de 2003, las empresas con capital estadounidense realizaron inversiones por
51,903.7 millones de d6lares (md), cantidad que representa el 68.0% de la IED total que ingres6 al pais
en ese lapso (76,286.5 md) "). Moreover, since the inception of NAFTA, U.S. FDI in Mexico
continues to climb: "U.S. investment since 1994 has reached $80,325.4 million, equivalent to 65.1% of
all FDI destined to the country between January 1994 and September 2003. Id. (translation mine) ("La
inversi6n estadounidense acumulada a partir de 1994 asciende a 80,325.4 md y equivale al 65.1% de la
IED total destmada al pais entre enero de 1994 y septiembre de 2003.").
109. See OECD Global Forum, supra note 108.
110. Id. at 95-104.
111. See Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 5-11.
112. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at Ch. 1; see also Gustavo Vega Canovas, Convergence: Future
Integration between Mexico and the United States, 10 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 17 (2002) (discussing the
characteristics and limitations of NAFTA as an integrative agreement).
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some of which include trade m goods and services, foreign investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement, strict rules of origin for products, anti-
dumping provisions, labor issues, environmental issues, and dispute resolution.'
3
The NAFTA Central Trade Commission ("Commission") is the central governing
body charged with overseeing implementation and dispute resolution among
Parties.1 4 The Commission has established several Working Groups dedicated to
promoting cooperation m specific areas of NAFTA and to conducting day-to-day
business." 5  The dispute resolution framework of NAFTA is, of course, of
particular interest for purposes of this article. A discussion of that framework m
general underscores the preference for international arbitration in modem
economic integration and, further, the unique and important character of Chapter
11 dispute resolution.
2. Dispute Resolution
The NAFTA dispute resolution framework serves to facilitate the purposes of
NAFTA-to provide a concrete regulatory structure for the reality of economic
integration m North America in an era of expansive trade and investment. In this
respect, the NAFTA framework underscores how international law is inextncably
intertwined with economic policy. As is the case m most international trade and
investment agreements, the NAFTA framework depends on alternative means of
dispute resolution through which the link between law and economics is
maintained and developed.i6 All three NAFTA Parties have umque legal
traditions, and the differences between Mexico's legal system and the legal
systems of the United States and Canada are tremendous. Thus, it is important to
be aware of these differences in order to understand why NAFTA Parties chose the
ADR framework and why ADR is the best method for resolving NAFTA-type
disputes, especially those involving a pnvate investor and a NAFTA Party.
a. Differmg Legal Traditions
A brief note on the differences between legal systems in NAFTA countries is
appropnate at this point. Some scholars have stated that:
NAFTA at its heart is about changing market forces, but law is the instrument and
to a degree the guarantor of change. It is through legal enactments and
proceedings that the new rules of the business game in North America are to be
realized. Each legal system bnngs with it traditions that can be expected to
influence how the NAFTA accords are interpreted, implemented, and applied.
1 17
113. See Canovas, supra note 113.
114. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2001.
115. USTR, "NAFTA Organizations, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/
organizaions.shtml#committees (last visilted Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "NAFTA Organizations"].
116. NAFTA Secretariat, Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (,A4FTA), at http://www.nafla-sec-alena.org [last visited Feb. 28, 2004].
117. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 32.
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The Canadian and U.S. legal systems are based on the common law tradition,
which derives its roots primarily from English junsprudence.s That is, law has
primarily developed and continues to be modified through judicial decisions., 19
This does not mean that Canadian and U.S. law do not rely on other primary
sources of law. On the contrary, the Canadian and U.S. legal systems today are
indeed vast networks of case law, legislation, and administrative rules and
regulations. 20  This, however, does not obscure the tremendous differences
between those countries' legal systems and Mexico's legal system. In contrast,
Mexico's legal system is based on the civil law tradition, deriving its roots mainly
from Spain, France and other Continental European legal traditions.i2  The
principle characteristic of the civil law tradition is that law is developed and
modified through enacted law, or legislative proscriptions.1
2 2
While an elaborate discussion of the differences among the legal systems of
NAFTA Parties is beyond the scope of this comment, it is worth mentioning that
the differences highlight conflicting ideas regarding the role of lawyers and judges
in the dispute resolution process, rules of procedure and junsdictional principles.1
23
Additionally, there are differences m the legacy of the rule of law among NAFTA
Parties. The United States and Canada can generally boast of individual histones
committed to the rule of law. In Mexico, however, where a written constitution
and general commitment to democracy "has successfully avoided military coups of
the kind that have been common throughout much of Latin America, one-party
rule and elitism have tainted the degree to which the rule of law has been able to
flourish. 124  This difference is especially pertinent in the context of foreign
investment and dispute resolution involved therem.
These differences serve as major obstacles to achieving uniformity of dispute
resolution procedures for suits involving private parties and NAFTA Parties in
order to deal with increased flows of commerce and investment across borders.
One author summarizes the effects of this non-uniformity on private individuals
118. See generally id. at 32-42, 49-56 (providing general overview of some major facets of the
Canadian and U.S. legal systems). Canada is common law country like the United States, and thus
similarly stands in contrast to Mexico's civil law system, but it can hardly be said that the Canadian and
U.S. legal systems are the same for purposes of achieving harmonization of dispute resolution
procedures. Id. Additionally, the Province of Quobec maintains its own civil code, which has roots in
the French Civil Code and is thus something of an amalgamation between the common law and civil
law, baring some similarity to Mexico's legal system. Id. This adds further complexity to the task of
achieving uniform dispute resolution procedures among NAFTA Parties. Id. at 39-42. See also
generally MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 438-764 (1994)
(discussing the foundations and characteristics of the common law tradition).
119. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 33.
120. See FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 35-38, 53-56.
121. Id. at 43-44. See generally GLENDON, supra note 119, at 44-276 (discussing the foundations
and charactenstics of the civil law tradition) and JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1999) (discussing
the same).
122. See GLENDON, supra note 119, at 192-94.
123. See generally id. at 130-251.
124. See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 48.
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engaged in transnational business in the United States and Mexico:
[Mexican law] limits damages that may be recovered in a civil action, whereas
United States law creates opportunities for unlimited damages, including punitive
damages. In Mexico, an injunction is not available as a remedy in commercial
disputes where damages are irreparable or cannot be measured in monetary terms.
In the United States, an injunction is often the preferred remedy for resolving a
commercial dispute. The jury is not a part of adjudication of civil disputes in
Mexico, whereas it is an integral part of the system in the United States. In
Mexico, trial evidence is mainly presented by documentation in front of judges
who question the witnesses, and pre-tnal discovery is not allowed on the same
scale as in the United States. These differences and others reinforce a party's
doubts that the legal system of his or her counterpart will lead to a definitive
resolution of a commercial dispute that will be fair.
125
The NAFTA dispute resolution framework establishes ADR procedures for
dispute settlement as a means of bypassing the complexities involved in
transnational litigation and legal harmonization. Understanding the basics of ADR
is thus essential to understanding the NAFTA dispute resolution framework.
b. ADR
126
ADR includes methods of resolving disputes without involving litigation in a
particular court system. i27 These methods include consultation, mediation and
arbitration. 128 Mediation, also known as conciliation, is simply "a process in which
parties to a dispute appoint a neutral third party to assist them in resolving their
disputes, and the goal is "a voluntary negotiated settlement."'129 Arbitration also
involves resolution of disputes by a neutral third party, but it is a more formal step
for parties to take. 30 Decisions of arbitration panels can be either binding or non-
binding, depending upon the rules to which the disputing parties have agreed.
1 31
There are several organizations that offer international arbitration guidelines, such
as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"),
132
125. Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp REsOL. 77, 89 (2000)
[hereinafter "Robert Paterson"].
126. For an introductory discussion on ADR, see International Trade Administration, Primer on
International Alternative Dispute Resolution, at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occicladr.hlml (last




130. American Arbitration Association, AAA Glossary of Dispute Resolution Terms, available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15784 (last visited Mar. 1,2004).
131. International ADR, supra note 127.
132. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), general information,
at http://www.uncitral.org/english/commiss/geninfo.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
"UNCITRAL Website"]. UNCITRAL is the main legal body of the United Nations for intemational
trade law. Id. It has set forth several rules and gidelines regarding international commercial
arbitration and conciliation, and, in particular, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted in 1976 are
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and others that offer guidelines and services such as the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA") 133 and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID").
134
Given the availability and characteristics of arbitration procedures for the
settlement of disputes involving parties from different countries, international
arbitration is increasingly favored by those involved in international business. One
scholar has summarized the advantages and disadvantages to arbitration in the
context of international commercial transactions:
[Tihe common arguments favoring arbitration include the following:
Arbitration can be simpler and less subject to rules of procedure and rules of
evidence.
Arbitration can be set in a neutral location, thus avoiding either party giving up
the "home court" advantage.
Parties to arbitration can select both the procedural and substantive law applicable
to the dispute.
Arbitration can more often take place without termination of contract
often selected by parties to disputes in international arbitration. Id. NAFTA Chapter II gives private
investors the option to select UNCITRAL rules as the applicable arbitration rules in an investor-state
dispute. See infra Part III.B.
133. American Arbitration Association, available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003).
134. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "ICSID
Website"]. The ICSID was created by the World Bank in 1966, believing "that an institution specially
designed to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors
could help could help promote increased flows of international investment. Id. The ICSID is
particularly important in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, as discussed in Part
III.B., infra. Notably,
ICSID provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member
countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries. Recourse to
ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once the parties have
consented to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, neither can unilaterally withdraw
its consent. Moreover, all ICSID Contracting States, whether or not parties to the
dispute, are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards.
Besides providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration under the ICSID Convention,
the Centre has a set of Additional Facility Rules authorizing the ICSID Secretariat to
administer certain types of proceedings between States and foreign nationals which fall
outside the scope of the Convention.
Provisions on ICSID arbitration are commonly found in investment contracts between
governments of member countries and investors from other member countries. Advance
consents by governments to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration can also be
found in about twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral investment treaties.
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performance, allowing dispute resolution to fill gaps in performance issues in
long-term contracts without otherwise disrupting performance.
Arbitral awards are more likely to be enforceable in the courts of multiple
countries because of the New York Arbitration Convention and the lack of any
similar multilateral convention dealing with the enforcement of court judgments.
Arbitral awards generally are not subject to appeal, thus bringing more certain
finality to the process.
In addition, the following factors may lead to a decision that litigation is more
desirable:
Court decisions are more often a matter of public record, making the interpretation
of the law in a given jurisdiction more predictable than in arbitration where the
arbitrators may have no published record and the institution under which
arbitration is conducted may not make public pnor arbitral awards on similar
issues.
If the other party will agree to jurisdiction in a local court, the "home court"
advantage of litigation may be available.
Preliminary relief, such as prejudgment attachment, has traditionally been more
often available in litigation than in arbitration.
Litigation is most often subject to appeal, allowing for correction or erroneous
application of the substantive law by the tribunal. 13
The preference for and importance of international arbitration m modem trade
agreements, and in particular investment agreements, has been summarized as
follows:
Arbitration has become a fixture in international trade and investment because it
compares favorably to the alternatives. It provides a neutral mechanism
characterized by private proceedings, flexible procedures, expert decision-makers,
relative finality, and enforceability of the result. For a host state, private
adjudication before a learned tribunal within a relaxed procedural framework will
often be preferable to defending against litigation in an investor's home state. 136
135. BRAND IBT, supra note 77, at 584-85.
136. Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic
Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP L. REv. 311, 318
(2000); see also Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing the obvious advantages of such mtemational
arbitration).
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The NAFTA dispute resolution framework is thus not unique to this preference in
that it establishes five different mechanisms for arbitration involving NAFTA
Parties.
c. NAFTA Framework in General
As mentioned, NAFTA lacks a concrete institutional framework. Dispute
resolution mechanisms are thus dispersed throughout the document in five main
areas. 137 Notably, "[tihe NAFTA dispute settlement system is a decentralized
system [It] operates by channeling certain types of trade conflicts into the
appropriate specialized dispute settlement mechanism of limited jurisdiction and
limited powers."'138  Mechanisms are found m Chapter 20, Chapter 19, Chapter
11,139 and m provisions under the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation ("NAAEC") 40 and the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation ("NAALC").
141
The Chapter 20 mechanism is the general trade dispute mechanism for
NAFTA countries. Parties may seek to resolve disputes on virtually any matter
related to the terms of NAFTA. 142 Dispute settlement under Chapter 20 proceeds
as follows: (1) Parties first undergo consultations; (2) if they cannot agree on
resolution of the dispute, the aggrieved Party may submit the dispute to the
Commission for resolution and recommendation; (3) if the Commission does not
facilitate a resolution, a Party may request that an arbitral panel hear the dispute,
administered by the NAFTA Secretariat; (4) the arbitration panel will then issue a
non-binding decision. 143 A decision by an arbitration panel does not directly affect
national law.'44 Further, if a Party does not comply with the arbitration ruling, the
prevailing Party has the right to withhold temporarily NAFTA benefits from the
non-compliant Party until the situation is remedied.
45
The Chapter 19 mechanism allows Parties to request arbitral panel review in
the first instance regarding dumping and countervailing duties.146 In a Chapter 19
dispute, the arbitral panel will issue a binding decision, as "[p]anels and
committees m Chapter 19 proceedings replace judicial review in the courts of
137 Chene O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an
Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR? 17 N.w. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 854
(1996).
138. Id. at 854-55. For more discussion on the NAFTA dispute resolution framework, see id at
854-58, and Lopez, supra note 54, at 606-09.
139. Taylor, supra note 138, at 854-55.
140. North Amercan Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
arts. 22-36, 32 ILM 1480, 1482 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
141. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 27-
41, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1502 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
142. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2004.
143. Id. at arts. 2006-2017
144. Taylor, supra note 138, at 856.
145. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2019; Lopez, supra note 54, at 606.
146. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1904; NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 434.
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competent jurisdiction in the NAFTA countries." 1
47
The NAALC mechanism creates "a four-step dispute settlement process that
progresses sequentially from initial consultations to ministenal consultations,
to expert evaluations to further consultations which may lead to non-binding
arbitration,"' 148 pertaining to labor matters. However, only "controversies
involving occupation safety child labor, or mmimum wage concerns may"
reach an arbitration panel.1 49 Only Parties have access to this mechamsm, and
decisions are non-binding.15
0
In the case of disputes regarding the environment, the NAAEC mechanism
authorizes the Environmental Secretariat "to conduct an investigation and to
prepare a report, potentially for distribution to the public.' 51  Parties may request
such an investigation when another Party allegedly fails to enforce effectively its
own environmental laws or when another Party's environmental laws are arguably
inadequate. 152 Decisions regarding such disputes, if they reach an arbitral panel,
are non-binding, and compliance is left to the threat of monetary damages or
suspension of NAFTA benefits to the Party in error. 
1
53
The common characteristic of the four NAFTA dispute settlement
mechanisms discussed above is that only NAFTA Parties have access to the ADR
proceedings. Moreover, apart from the binding nature of arbitration decisions
under Chapter 19 the other three mechanisms only allow for non-binding
decisions and depend on political and economic pressure for enforcement.154 The
Chapter 11 mechanism, on the other hand, stands in contrast to the general
NAFTA dispute resolution framework in its procedures, results and implications.
Chapter 11 bridges the gap between private parties and governments by
establishing a binding, international law-based dispute resolution regime for
disputes between NAFTA investors and NAFTA Parties. I s In this sense, it is a
progressive and pragmatic approach to incorporating private actors and
international law into the process of governing economic integration.
Chapter 1 1 is thus a distinctive feature of NAFTA, and warrants careful
analysis. More importantly for the purposes of this article, given the Chapter 11
framework and Mexico's traditional outlook on the applicability of international
law to foreign investment, this analysis prompts discussion of whether Chapter 11
dispute resolution is beneficial to Mexico. With the background information now
in place, a more narrow discussion of Chapter 11 and Mexico is in order. A look
at the Chapter 1 1 text m detail and the first four final arbitration awards involving
Mexico provides the proper focus for that analysis.
147 NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 437- NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1904.
148. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607-08. See NAALC, supra note 142, at arts. 27-41.
149. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607-08. See NAALC, supra note 142, at art. 29.
150. See NAALC, supra note 142, arts. 27-49; see also Lopez, supra note 54, at 608.
151. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607. See NAAEC, supra note 141, at arts. 22-36.
152. NAAEC, supra note 141, at arts. 22-34; Lopez, supra note 54, at 606-07.
153. NAEEC, supra note 141, at art. 36; Lopez, supra note 54, at 607.
154. Lopez, supra note 54, at 605-08.
155. See mnfra Part III.B.
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III. NAFTA CHAPTER I I
A. Substantive Provisions
As mentioned, NAFTA Chapter 11 deals specifically with foreign investment
in North America. It creates broad protections for foreign investors in an effort to
stimulate integration beyond trade. 156 Indeed, there is a strong correlation between
foreign investment and trade. As one author notes, "[t]he subject of international
investment arises from one basic idea: the mobility of capital. If there is a
competitive advantage to be gamed, capital can and will get there. ' 1 7 Moreover,
"[t]he flow of capital takes four forms: foreign direct investment, bond
purchases, portfolio equity flows, and lending directly to support trade."' 58
Foreign direct investment ("FDI") represents the deepest form of investment
commitment, as it is "investment by foreigners through ownership of equity shares
or setting up production facilities within a country "'59
Section A of Chapter 11 is devoted to reducing barrers to foreign investment.
In doing so, it broadly defines what constitutes investors and investment.
Investment includes any economic interest in an enterprise, including equity
securities, debt securities, loans, and real estate or other property acquisitions.
160
156. Indeed, one of the objectives of NAFTA is to "increase substantially investment opportunities
in the territories of the Parties. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 102(c); see also Office of NAFTA and
Inter-Amencan Affairs, "Investment, at http://www.mac.doc.gov/naftainvestrnent.htn (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "NAFTA Investment"]:
Chapter 11 of NAFTA addresses investment issues among Canada, Mexico and the
United States. U.S. objectives for the protection of investors and investments in the
NAFTA Chapter 11 were to eliminate barriers to investment within the context of U.S.
policy and law, to encourage adoption of market-oriented domestic policies that treat
investment fairly and in a non-discriminatory manner, and to protect investment through
appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms. The NAFTA Chapter It succeeds in
obtaining these goals, thereby allowing companies to invest throughout the NAFTA
region on a level playing field.
For a detailed review of the provisions in and objectives of Chapter 11, see Rodolpho Sandoval,
Chapter Eleven: Investments under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1195 (1994); see also Price, Overview, supra note 70.
157. CZINKOTA, supra note 23, at 175.
158. FRANKO, supranote 38, at 177
159. Id. at 467" see generally CZINKOTA, supra note 23, at 175-79 (discussing in detail foreign
direct investment and the rationale behind engaging in such investment); see generally JOAN E. SPERO
& JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Ch. 8 (5 h ed. 1997) (discussing foreign
direct investment in detail and the arguments for and against such investment in developing countries).
160. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139(a)-(f). See also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at
302 (discussing the breadth of the definition of investment under NAFTA Chapter 11, pointing out
specifically that "[i]nvestment covers interests that entitle an owner to share income or profits of an
enterprise, assets of the enterprise on dissolution, real estate, and tangible or intangible property,
including intellectual property."). However, investment does not include:
(i) claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in
the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade
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An investor of a NAFTA Party is "a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national
or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an
investment." 161 In line with the hallmarks of modern trade agreements, Chapter 11
sets forth national treatment 62 and most-favored nation treatment 163 standards for
investors in NAFTA Parties, and mandates a minimum standard of treatment in
accordance with principles of international law.' 64 Article 1106 attempts to
facilitate the free flow of investment across borders by limiting NAFTA Parties'
abilities to establish performance requirements on investments, such as export or
domestic content mmnmums, or restrictions on sales volume and technology
transfer. i61 Other key provisions m Section A of Chapter 11 geared toward
stimulating investment include a prohibition on excluding foreign nationals from
being officers of an investor enterprise 166 and a restriction on placing limitations on
monetary transfers. 1
67
Perhaps most importantly, Chapter 11 establishes firm guidelines for
government expropriation of investments covered by NAFTA. It "covers direct,
indirect, and so-called 'creeping' expropnaton."' (' s Article 1110 provides:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropnate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its terrtory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or
(j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in
subparagraphs (a) through (h).
NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139(h)-(j).
161. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139.
162. Id. at art. 1102. "Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors Id.
163. Id. at art. 1103. "Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of non-
Party Id., see also NAFTA CouRsEBooK, supra note 71, at 302 (explaining "that treaty-
protected investments will be treated at least as favorably by the NAFTA state as nationals and firms
from any third state.").
164. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1104-1105. For example, under Article 1105(1), NAFTA
Parties must "accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. Id. This is of
particular interest given Mexico's traditional policy on the applicability of international law to foreign
investment. See supra Part II.B.I.
165. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1106(l)-(3); see also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at
303 (explaining that "NAFTA prohibits the imposition of performance requirements includ[ing]
export performance, domestic content, domestic sourcmg, trade balancing, product mandating, and
technology transfer requirements.").
166. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1107. However, "[a] Party may require that majority of the
board of directors, or any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is an investment of an
investor of another Party, be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of the Party Id.
at art. 1107(2).
167. Id. at art. 1109; see also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 304 (explaining that "[t]his
includes transfers to the investor, such as remittance of profits and dividends, the payment of interest
and capital gains, management fees, and proceeds from the sale of liquidation of an investment.").
168. Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 730.
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(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of
expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occumng because the
intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation critena shall include
going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property,
and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.
169
It should be noted that Chapter 11 also takes steps to protect legitimate
government regulations regarding the environment and public health. Article 1114
provides:
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.170
The substantive provisions in Chapter 11 thus embody established principles
of international law, and carry out a significant policy change for Mexico
regarding the applicability of international law to foreign investment. The direct
access dispute resolution framework set out m Section B of Chapter 11 further
serves to facilitate cross border investment by providing a predictable legal
structure based on principles of international law within which to resolve
investment disputes.171
B. Direct Access Dispute Resolution
The Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution framework derives its
structure from Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") promoted by the United
169. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 11 10(t)-(3).
170. Id. at art. 1114.
171. Id. at arts. 1115-1138.
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States.'72 Notably, such investment treaties "commonly dealt with the key issue[s]
of mechanisms for settling disputes between foreign investors and host
governments, which included provisions for binding international arbitration.
17
1
The purpose of the Chapter 1 1 dispute settlement provisions is clear: "this Section
establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both
equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principal of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal."' 174  A
principle goal of Chapter 11 is therefore to establish a friendly investment climate
via predictable legal rules and principles as derived from international law.
Articles 1116 and 1117 grant private investors from NAFTA Parties the right
to seek arbitration, on behalf of themselves or on behalf of an enterprise from a
NAFTA Party, against NAFTA Parties for injury or loss due to alleged violations
of the provisions in Section A of Chapter 11, and also m other limited
circumstances arising from Parties' obligations pursuant to other Chapters of
NAFTA.1 75 There is a three-year time limit for filing a claim, running "from the
date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge
172. Currently, there is no multilateral framework for the regulation of foreign investment. See R.
Todd Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures m Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT.
Moving Toward Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REv 541, 544, 567 (1994); see also
BRAND IBT, supra note 78, at 1061. Conversely, the WTO provides a framework for international
trade. See WTO, "Trade and Investment, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/i
nveste/investe.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "WTO Investment"] ("Despite several
efforts since the end of WWII, to date there does not exist set of coherent, substantive, and binding
multilateral rules governing foreign investment."). Absent such a framework to regulate foreign
investment, the United States has signed BITs with several countries, and these agreements contain
standard provisions for dispute resolution in accordance with established principles of international law.
See BRAND IBT, supra note 78, at 1053, 1058-59; see generally Shenln, supra at 541-82 BITs have
thus become a key component of economic integration in addition to free trade agreements:
"The U.S. Model BIT covers five main subjects:
general principles for treatment of foreign investors;
conditions of expropriation and the measure of compensation payable;
the right to free transfer without delay of profits and other funds associated with
investments;
the prohibition of inefficient and trade distorting practices; and
access to international arbitration for settlement of investment disputes.
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANsACTiONS: DocuMENTs 124 (Ronald Brand ed.,
2000) [hereinafter "Brand, FUNDAMENTALS"]. Notably, the Model BIT provides for binding
international arbitration against signatory states. Id. at 125. To view a version of the U.S. Model BIT,
see Brand, FUNDAMENTALS at 126-32; available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/modelbithtml
(last visited May 1, 2004).
173. NAFTA COuRSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 325-26.
174. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1115.
175. Id. at arts. 1116-1117. An investor has standing to submit a claim to arbitration when:
(1) [T]he government of another NAFTA party has breached an obligation under Section
A of Chapter 11; (2) [a] NAFTA party has acted in manner inconsistent with the
party's obligations under Chapter 11 (investment) or Chapter 14 (financial services) in
the exercise of its regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority; or (3) a
state monopoly has acted in a manner inconsistent with a party's obligations under
Chapter II where the entity 'exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other
governmental authority that the Party has delegated to it "
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of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or damage"
m the case of individual claims,' 76 and "from the date on which the enterprise first
acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and
knowledge that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage" in the case of claims
filed on behalf of an enterprise. 77  Thus, the hallmark of NAFTA Chapter 11
investment dispute resolution, which sets it apart from other NAFTA dispute
settlement mechanisms, is that private investors have direct access to arbitration
against Parties.
The procedure for Chapter 11 dispute settlement is set out in Articles 1118
through 1137 Disputing parties are directed to engage in consultation and
negotiation to resolve the dispute before arbitration is commenced. 78 An investor
that decides to submit a claim for arbitration against a NAFTA Party must notify
that Party at least ninety days prior to submitting the claim.179 However, an
aggrieved investor may not submit a claim for arbitration unless a minmumm of six
months have passed since the alleged breach and injury 180 If an investor submits a
claim to arbitration pursuant to either Article 1116 or 1117 the claimant must
consent in writing to the arbitration procedures set forth in Chapter 11, and must
waive in writing any right to litigate before the courts of any NAFTA Party on the
issues submitted for settlement in arbitration. 8 ' With respect to Mexico
specifically, the Chapter 11 text prohibits an investor from simultaneously
submitting a claim in arbitration against Mexico and bringing a similar action in a
Mexican court. 182
Section B of Chapter 11 also sets forth guidelines for appointing arbitrators,
83
NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 327. See also Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 27-28 (listing scenarios
where investors may have standing under Chapter I1).
176. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1116(2).
177. Id. at art. 1117(2).
178. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1118-1137
179. Id. at art. 1119.
180. Id. atart. 1120(i).
181. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1121(l)-(3) (Under article l121(1)(b) and (2)(b), a private
investor utilizing Chapter 11 arbitration is not barred from obtaining declaratory or injunctive relief
from the courts of NAFTA Parties. Article 1122 assures that NAFTA Parties consent to private
investor arbitration as set out in Chapter 11), available at http://tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/Nafta/I .invest
(last visited May 1, 2004).
182. Id. at annex 1120.1(a).
183. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1123-1125 (Arbitral tribunals consist of three arbitrators,
unless the disputing parties agree otherwise under article 1123); see also Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter
11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared? 2002
B.Y.U.L. REV. 527, 534-35 (2002) (In practice, "each party to the dispute selects one arbitrator, and the
two selected arbitrators in turn choose third arbitrator who will preside over the proceeding."). Thus
the very composition of the arbitral tribunal is neutral. Jones summary of the general procedures that
follow after the arbitration panel is selected:
Once the arbitration panel is selected, it is not uncommon for all interested parties to
meet and allow the panel to hear an outline of each respective case "on the merits.
Before the formal oral hearing, the claimant in the case will submit a "memorial, the
"chief moving document" of the arbitration, containing "a statement of relevant facts;
statement of law; and the submissions. The respondent will then issue his "counter-
memorial. This interaction may take place second time if the parties agree. Also,
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selecting the place of arbitration,'8 consolidating of claims, 8 5 and for the
applicable law." Section B also provides for participation by non-disputing
NAFTA Parties. 18 7 Other provisions in Section B deal with damages awards and
the finality and enforcement of an arbitral decision. 8 8 The arbitration tribunal may
award an injured private investor monetary damages, interest, restitution of
property and costs for arbitration, but it "may not order a Party to pay punitive
damages." 189
The arbitration panel may grant interim relief to a disputing party to protect
rights in property, but it "may not order attachment or enjoin the application of the
measure alleged to constitute a breach 1,,90 Moreover, an arbitral decision is
binding only between the disputing parties, 19 1 and "[elach Party shall provide for
before the oral hearing, post-bnef/pre-hearing conferences may take place to accomplish
the "marshaling of evidence" that the parties plan to present at the hearing. According to
modem international arbitration rules, the parties have the option to forgo the oral
hearing and to rest on their written submissions. However, very few claimants rest on
their written submissions, as the overwhelming majority considers the oral hearing to be
invaluable to their case.
Id. at 535-56.
In addition, disputing parties often submit post-hearing briefs to the arbitration panel in order to clarify
their positions on certain issues. Id. See also Pearce & Coe, supra note 137, at 319-22.
184. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1129 (Arbitration must take place within the territory of a
Party "which is a party to the New York Convention, unless otherwise agreed); Jones, supra note 184,
at 535 (acknowledging that normally "disputing parties will elect to hold the arbitration in the third
country not involved in the dispute to add a measure of neutrality to the proceedings.").
185. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1125; Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 727 (no pagination
electronic version).
186. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1120, 1130, 1131. (Under Article 1120, an investor may
submit a claim to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID or
under the UNCITRAL rules for arbitration, and the relative procedural rules apply to the arbitration.
Article 1130 is the general governing law provision, stating that an arbitration panel "shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law. Article
1131(1) is the general governing law provision, stating that an arbitration panel "shall decide the issues
in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law "); see also
supra notes 133 and 135 (discussing those organizations). Currently, of the NAFTA Parties only the
United States is a signatory to the ICSID. ICSID Website, supra note 135. As Jones notes, "[tiherefore,
and arbitration claim brought by an American investor against either Canada or Mexico would need to
be governed by either ICSID's Additional Faculty Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules. Jones, supra note
184, at 534. Jones also mentions that the number of Chapter 11 arbitrations governed by UNCITRAL
or the ICSID thus far have been about equal. Id.
187 NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1128, 1129, 1133. ("On written notice to the disputing parties,
a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on question of interpretation" of NAFTA. Additionally,
there are provisions for submissions by expert witnesses); Jones, supra note 184, at 536, (commenting
that the arbitration panel has "a great deal of discretion in determining the timing and manner of third
party submissions that will be allowed").
188. NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts 1134-1135; Jones, supra note 184, at 536 (decisions are made
on a majority vote basis).
189. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1134.
190. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1133 (a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal has no authority to require
a NAFTA Party to change its laws).
191. Id. at art. 1135(1) (thus Chapter 11 arbitral have no precedential value. However, tribunals
often look to previous awards for some guidance); see Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 727 (no
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the enforcement of an award m its territory."'192 In order to effect enforcement of
an award, an investor "may seek enforcement of an arbitration award under the
ICSID Convention, the New York Convention or the Inter-American
Convention ,193 Additionally, if a NAFTA Party does not comply with an
arbitral award, the Party of the investor may temporarily suspend extension of
NAFTA benefits to the non-compliant Party under Chapter 20.'94 It is important to
note also that a losing NAFTA Party may bring an action in the country where the
arbitration decision was rendered to have that decision modified or vacated. 95
However, there is no official process for appellate review of Chapter 11
arbitrations. i96
C. Arbitrations against Mexico
At the time of this writing, there have been nine instances when private
investors have invoked the NAFTA Chapter 1 1 dispute resolution mechanism
against Mexico. 197 Arbitral tribunals have made four final awards m arbitrations
involving Mexico so far, one of which is again pending after the claimants
resubmitted their claim.9S This discussion focuses on the first four final arbitral
awards involving Mexico. All of the claims filed against the United States and
Canada have been brought by private investors m those countries-none have been
brought by an investor or enterprise based m Mexico against the United States or
Canada.
199
1. Azintan v. United Mexican States
2
00
In late 1993, Naucalpan, a suburb of Mexico City, entered into a multi-year
pagination electronic version).
192. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(4).
193. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(6); ICSID Website, supra note 137 (the United States is
the only NAFTA Party that is signatory to the ICSID Convention); SICE, Inventory, supra note 2
(both the United States and Mexico are signatones to the Inter-Amencan Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration); UNCITRAL Website, supra note 133 (all three NAFTA Parties, however, are
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention). Thus, for example, a NAFTA investor who is successful in Chapter
11 arbitration against Mexico may seek to have the award enforced in Mexico pursuant to the New
York Convention or the Inter-Amencan Convention).
194. Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 735.
195. Jones, supra note 184, at 536.
196. See generally NAFTA, supra note 10; see infra Part IV.B.
197 U.S. Department of State, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/ (last visited June 12, 2003) [hereinafter
"State Department Website"] (for an official listing of the pending arbitrations and accessible
documents related thereto); Todd Weiler, NAFTALAW.ORG, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Weiler Website"].
198. Weiler Website, supra note 198 (look at "Mexico" under the Dispute link).
199. State Department Website, supra note 198; Weiler Website, supra note 198 (for a list,
background discussion, and links to documents for such arbitrations).
200. Azntan & Davitian & Baca v. Mex., Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), available at
Weiler Website, supra note 198 [hereinafter Azinian Award"]; see generally Robert Paterson, supra
note 126, at 110 (discussing the Aziman Award in detail).
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waste-management contract with Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan S.A. de C.V
("DESONA"), a Mexican corporation that had some U.S. citizen shareholders.20'
From the beginning of its operations, DESONA did not perform according to its
contract obligations. 2° 2  The Ayuntamiento of Naucalpan, dissatisfied with
DESONA's performance, annulled the contract four months after DESONA began
operations, and the State Administrative Tribunal upheld the annulment.0 3 On
appeal, the Superior Chamber of the Administrative Tribunal affirmed, finding
nine "irregularities" by DESONA relating to the contract. 204 DESONA then filed
an action in amparo in the Federal Circuit Court, and that court upheld the
Administrative Tribunal's rulings.205
In 1997 two years after the Circuit Court's ruling, Azinian and other U.S.
shareholders filed a claim in arbitration against Mexico under Chapter 11, arguing
that the Ayuntamiento's cancellation of the waste-management contract was a
breach of the provisions on expropriation and minimum standard of treatment.20 6
The claimants requested damages in an average amount of $16 million plus various
costs and interest.20 7 The arbitral tribunal noted that, as a threshold issue, it first
had to determine whether it had competence to review the dispute.208 Indeed, the
tribunal candidly asserted that "[i]t is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may
be disappointed in their dealings with public authorities, and disappointed yet
again when national courts reject their complaints. NAFTA was not intended to
provide foreign investors with blanket protection from this kind of
disappointment ,,209 Thus, an investor cannot use Chapter 11 arbitration
simply as a forum within which to argue disapproval of government actions or
domestic court decisions with respect to the investor's business dealings in a
NAFTA Party 210
The tribunal found that the claimants had satisfied the notice and waiver
201. Aziman Award, supra note 201, 9 1-9.
202. Id. 10. Specifically, DESONA did not operate with proper or sufficient equipment necessary
to conduct the waste-management services as called for by the contract. Id.
203. Id. IN117-20 ("Ayuntamiento" translates to city or local government).
204. Id. 21.
205. Id. 22 (the Mexican amparo is a legal action whereby an alleged injured party may challenge
judicial decisions and administrative acts, seek protection of constitutional rights, and challenge the
constitutionality of law); see generally Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of
Amparo, 9 CAL. W INT'L L.J. 306 (1979) and KENNETH KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. A CASEBOOK 127-60 (1975) (for more discussion on the Mexican
amparo).
206. Azinian Award, supra note 201, 24, 75.
207. Id. 75.
208. Id. 35. The panel explained:
Arbitral junsdiction under Section B is limited not only as to the persons who may
invoke it (they must be nationals of a State signatory to NAFTA), but also as to subject
matter: claims may not be submitted to investor-state arbitration under Chapter Eleven
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requirements under Chapter 11 arbitration, 2 11 but ultimately ruled that the
claimants did not have a valid claim under Chapter 11.212 The panel had particular
difficulty with the way m which the claimants argued their case. Specifically the
complaint averred, at base, that the Ayuntamiento's actions were a breach of
contract.21 3 The tribunal explained that "NAFTA cannot possibly be read to
create a regime, which would have elevated a multitude of ordinary
transactions with public authorities into potential international disputes. 21 4 The
critical issue was therefore whether the Ayuntamiento's annulment of the contract
violated the Article 1110 provisions regarding expropriation; 215 or in other words,
whether the alleged breach of contract was an expropriation.
The tribunal summarized the problem in 4zinian as follows:
The Ayuntamento believed it had grounds for holding the Concession Contract to
be invalid under Mexican law governing public service concessions. At
DESONA's initiative, these grounds were tested by three levels of Mexican
courts, and in each case were found to be extant. How can it be said that Mexico
breached NAFTA when the Ayunatrmento of Naucalpan purported to declare the
invalidity of a Concession Contract which by its terms was subject to Mexican
law, and to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts, and the courts of Mexico then
agreed with the Ayuntamento's determination?
216
Thus, claimants had to prove that the decisions of the Mexican courts breached
Chapter 11, which, although theoretically possible according to the tribunal, was
not even argued by claimants.2 17
The tribunal also discussed at length the circumstances surrounding the status
of the investors themselves. It found that the claimants mislead the Ayuntamiento
with regard to their background in the waste-management business, the availability
of capital to effect contract performance and the viability of the long-term aims of
the waste-management services. 2'8 Indeed, the tribunal found that claimants were
211. Id. 136.





217. Id. 9 97, 100. The panel explained that international arbitral panels can be called upon to
assess the validity of judicial decisions with regard to international law and treaty obligations. Id.
98-99. Given that the claimants in Azntan did not allege misconduct by the Mexican courts, the panel
concluded "[lor if there is no complaint against a determination by a competent court that a contract
governed by Mexican law was invalid under Mexican law, there is by definition no contract to be
expropriated. Id. 100. Further, finding no violation of Article 1110, the panel dismissed fortiort
claimants' Article 1105 claim. Id. 92.
Paterson notes that "[t]he ruling of the tribunal in the Aziman case is characterized by
complete absence of any discussion of the meaning of Anicle 1110. Robert Paterson, supra note 126,
at 116. He notes that the panel's analysis indicates that it did not consider whether the annulment itself
violated Article I 10, but rather focused on the decisions of the Mexican courts. Id. Nonetheless,
Paterson admits that Azinian stands for "effective use of Chapter II to resolve claim that was clearly
found unpersuasive on its merits. Id. at 118.
218. Aziman Award, supra note 201, 9 29-33, 105. The panel also noted various facts regarding
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not "an inherently plausible group of investors., 2 19 Azinian, therefore, is important
for Mexico, and all NAFTA Parties, in that it demonstrates that (1) investors may
not use Chapter 11 as a means of resolving normal business disputes; (2) such
investors may not use Chapter II to eviscerate domestic court rulings regarding
such disputes, and; (3) a Chapter 11 tribunal will scrutinize the plausibility of an
investor and the soundness of an investment when deciding whether the investor
should prevail in a Chapter 11 claim. 220
2. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States22 '
In 1998, Waste Management, Inc. (formerly USA Waste Services, Inc.), a
U.S. corporation, filed a Chapter 11 arbitration clami against Mexico on behalf of
itself and its Mexican subsidiary, Acaverde, S.A. de C.V 222 The claimants alleged
that Mexico, through the actions of the municipality of Acapulco, the State of
Guerrero and Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios POblicos, S.N.C.
("BANOBRAS"), violated Articles 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA.2  In its Notice of
Arbitration, Waste Management averred that Acapulco did not treat Acaverde
according to international standards as required by Article 1105 by failing to make
full payment to Acaverde for services performed under a long-term waste-
management contract and then transfemng Acaverde's contract rights to a third
party 224 Claimants then argued that Acapulco's default on payment was unlawful
expropriation as per Article 1110, as such nonperformance "rendered worthless
Claimants' rights acquired and investments made under the concession" and
"effectively extinguished Acaverde's viability as an enterpnse."2' 5 Waste
Management claimed $60 million in damages plus interest.
2 2 6
one of the claimant-investor's business record which clearly indicated a pattern of questionable
conduct. Id. 121.
219. Id. 29.
220. Despite its final ruling, the tribunal did not award costs to Mexico, which it could have done
under Chapter 11. Id. IN 125-26; NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(1). Several factors dissuaded the
tribunal from awarding costs, one of which was the fact that the Chapter II mechanism was "a new and
novel mechanism for the resolution of international investment disputes. Aziman Award, supra note
201, 126. Indeed, Aziman was the first investor-state arbitration decided under NAFTA. Id. 79.
221. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 2000 Case No. ARB
(AF)/98/2 (Jun. 2), availabl at http//www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/waste award.pdf [hereinafter
"Waste Management I Award"]. See also William S. Dodge, International Decision: Waste
Management, Inc. v. Mexico, 95 AJ.I.L. 186 (2001) [hereinafter "Dodge, Waste Management"], and
Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management, Inc. v. United
Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirement for Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA,
69 FoRDHlAM L. REv. 2655 (2001) (both discussing the first Waste Management arbitration award in
detail).
222. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, 1.
223. Id.
224. ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility), Notice of Institution ofArbitration Proceedings, Sep.
29, 1998, USA Waste Services, Inc. and Acaverde, S.A. de C.V v. United Mexican States, available at




DENV J. INT'LL. &POL'Y
The arbitral award centered on whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to
resolve the dispute, or more specifically, whether claunants followed the proper
waiver requirements set out m Article 1121.227 Under that article, claimant was
required to waive its right to litigate in Mexican courts the claims it brought before
the tribunal. 22' The claimants submitted a waiver with an exception that such
waiver did not bar them from seeking relief against the government entities and
BANOBRAS for alleged violations of Mexican law other than the alleged
violations of NAFTA.229 Mexico contested this waiver and thus the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal.23 °
In fact, subsequent to filing the Chapter 11 arbitration, Acaverde pursued two
pending clains against BANOBRAS in Mexican courts for breach of a letter of
credit until Acaverde lost both claims at the appellate level in March and October
of 1999 2 Acaverde also filed a claim in arbitration against Acapulco in October
of 1998, one month after the Chapter 11 arbitration was filed, from which it did not
withdraw until July 1999 232 The arbitration tribunal ultimately found that
claimants did not comply with Article 1121, and dismissed the claim for want of
jurisdiction.
233
In holding that compliance with the waiver requirements of Article 1121 was
a "condition precedent" to the arbitration, the tribunal stated that it had to
determine whether claimants submitted "the waiver in accordance with the
formalities envisaged under NAFTA and whether it has respected the terms of
same through the material act of either dropping or desisting from initiating
parallel proceedings before other courts or tribunals." 2 4  Although claimants
satisfied the formal requirements of Article 1121, they failed to comply materially
with that article.235  Acaverde pursued other legal action with respect to the
conduct of Acapulco and BANOBRAS for more than a year after it filed for
Chapter 1 arbitration.236 Notably, the tribunal summarized:
In effect, it is possible to consider that proceedings instituted in a national forum
may exist which do not relate to those measures alleged to be in violation of the
NAFTA by a member state of the NAFTA, in which case it would be feasible that
such proceedings could coexist simultaneously with an arbitration proceeding
under the NAFTA. However, when both legal actions have a legal basis derived
from the same measures, they can no longer continue simultaneously in light of
227. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, 7, 17
228. Id; NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1120-1122.




233. Id. 3 1. Interestingly, the tribunal rejected Mexico's argument that the arbitral tribunal must,
as one of its duties emanating from Article 1121, notify domestic tribunals of disputing investor's
waiver. Id. 15. It held that such a task is that of the Mexican government, as the tribunal does not
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the imminent risk that the Claimant may obtain the double benefit in its claim for
damages. This is precisely what NAFTA Article 1121 seeks to avoid.
237
Thus, Article 1121 is clear in that it prohibits a tribunal from entertaining
jurisdiction over the dispute given that Acaverde maintained what were essentially
duplicate proceedings in Mexican courts.238
In September of 2000, Waste Management re-filed for Chapter 11
239arbitration. Mexico again contested the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal,
arguing that claimants' first unsuccessful attempt at Chapter 11 arbitration barred
them from resubmitting their case to another Chapter 11 panel.240 The first
tribunal did not indicate whether its decision was res judicata as to claimants' re-
filing of its Chapter 11 claims. 241 The second tribunal posited that the issue of its
jurisdiction over the resubmitted claim depended on "what amounts to a
submission of a claim within the meaning of Article 1121 .,,242
It found that Article 1121 contemplates a submission of a claim for
adjudication on the merits, ' '243 and therefore even if Chapter 11 envisaged that
investors have one opportunity to submit a claim for arbitration, a claim that is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for failure to comply with Article 1121 waiver
237. Id. 927.
238. In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Highet argued that claimants did not violate the waiver
requirements, and that the panel had jurisdiction. Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, (U.S. v. Mex.),
Dissenting Opinion, 2000 Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Jun. 2) 39, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/wastediss.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004). He argued that the
Article 1121 waiver requirements should not be read strictly, and also should not be read to include
"that litigations subject to the waiver be affirmatively withdrawn, that no further litigation be instituted,
and that no appeals be conducted. Id. 32. Mr. Highet posited that Chapter I I is not explicit to the
termination of such litigation in light of pending Chapter I I arbitration, as Annex 1120.1 already bars
investors from simultaneously pursuing remedy for expropnation and violation of international law
under Chapter II arbitration and through litigation in Mexican courts. Id. IN 34, 38. Here, claimants'
actions in Mexican tribunals were based on different causes of action than their claims under Chapter
11, and therefore their continued litigation in Mexican courts should not have prevented the panel from
asserting jurisdiction over the claim. Id. 39. Even more, for Mr. Highet, the question of whether
claimants' waiver is valid should go to the admissibility of particular claim rather than to the
jurisdiction of the panel, because the majority's interpretation presents "drastically preclusive effect.
Id. . 56, 9. See also Dodge, Waste Management, supra note 224, at 188. Dodge notes that Mr.
Highet believed "the purpose of Article 1121 was not to bar local remedies for related commercial
claims, but to protect the NAFTA parties from 'parallel actions in their own judicial systems that would
raise NAFTA claims."' Id. Dodge, nonetheless, agrees with the majority's opinion in that claimants
did not comply with the waiver requirements. Id. at 189. He also adds that an investor has three years
to seek remedy from domestic courts before filing for Chapter II arbitration. Id. at 190.
239. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, (U.S. v. Mex.), Award on Jurisdiction,
2002 Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Jun. 26) 1, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/12244.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter "Waste Management II Jurisdiction
Decision"].
240. Id. 9 3. Indeed, Mexico interpreted NAFTA Article 1121 to mean that "an election under that
provision is irrevocable and allows Claimant a single opportunity to vindicate its NAFTA claim
before a Chapter II tribunal. Id. 17




DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
requirements would still not bar a claimant's resubmission. 24 4 Also, none of the
Mexican tribunals m which Acaverde brought actions entertained claimants'
NAFTA claims,245 and further, under international law "if the jurisdictional flaw
can be corrected, there is m prnciple no objection" to allowing a disputing party
the opportunity to resubmit its claim.' , 246 The arbitral tribunal therefore held that
neither NAFTA nor international law precluded claimants from resubmitting their
case before a Chapter 11 panel. 247  Moreover, the tribunal did not find that
claimants abused process in submitting their claims for arbitration under NAFTA,
and therefore could proceed.248 The tribunal has not yet made a final ruling on the
merits.
3. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States24 9
In 1996, Metalclad (a U.S. corporation) filed for arbitration under Chapter 11
on behalf of Confmamiento Tdcnico de Residuos Insdustriales ("COTERIN"), a
Mexican waste disposal company wholly-owned by Metalclad's wholly-owned
U.S. subsidiary, Eco-Metalclad Corporation ("ECO").25 0 In 1993, Metalclad had
acquired COTERIN via a purchase-option agreement on the basis that COTERIN
had obtained all necessary permits from Mexican authorities to operate a
hazardous waste landfill in Guadalcazar, State of San Luis Potos. 251 Pursuant to
federal and state construction permits and under the assumption that the State of
San Luis Potosi approved of the project, Metalclad began construction of a landfill
in May of 1994 and continued work until October of 1994, when Guadalcazar
ordered Metalclad to stop construction because Metalclad did not have a
construction permit from that city.25 2  Metalclad resumed construction in
November of 1994 after federal officials informed it that its city permit application




Both a study conducted by the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi as
244. Id. 33.
245. Id. T 35.
246. Id. 936.
247. Id. 37. The tribunal stated that "there is no doubt that, in general, the dismissal of a claim by
an international tribunal on grounds of lack of jurisdiction does not constitute decision on the merits
and does not preclude a later claim before a tribunal which has jurisdiction. Id. 43. Thus Mexico's
argument that the first tribunal's decision was resjudicata as to the merits of claimants' action failed.
Id.
248. Id. 48-50. The claimants were "open" in the prior proceedings and did not act in "bad
faith" so to give the tribunal reason to reject the resubmission. Id.
249. Metalclad Corp. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30,
2000), available at State Department Website, supra note 203 [hereinafter "Metalclad Award"]. See
Pearce & Coe, supra note 137, at 35 (discussing the arbitral tribunal phase of Metalclad in detail);
William S. Dodge, International Decision: Metalcad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 A.J.I.L. 910 (2001)
[hereinafter "Dodge, Metalclad"] (discussing all phases of Metalc/ad); Brower II, supra note 13, at 51-
69 (same).





NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DISPUTE RESOLUTION & MEXICO
well as an audit by the Mexican Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of the
Environment confirmed the suitability of Metalclad's project, and Metalclad
completed construction in March of 1995.254 Protestors m Guadalcazar, however,
prevented the landfill operation from commencing.25 5 Metalclad thereafter entered
into extensive negotiations with independent federal agencies, the result of which
was a detailed agreement ("Convenio") permitting operation of the landfill in
exchange for several concessions on the part of Metalclad. 25 6 The State of San
Luis Potosi denounced the Convemo, and Guadalcazar officially denied
Metalclad's construction permit.
257
In 1996, Guadalcazar obtained an order from a Mexican court enjoining
Metalclad's operation of the landfill.258 Negotiations to resolve the matter failed,
prompting Metalclad to file a claim against Mexico under Chapter 11 m January of
1997 259 Metalclad alleged breaches of Articles 1105 and 1110260 and requested
more than $43 million in damages.26' In September of 1997 just before leaving
office, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued an ecological decree declaring the
area encompassing the landfill an environmentally protected zone "for the
protection of rare cactus" found m the area.262
The arbitral tribunal first ruled that Mexico violated NAFTA Article 1105 in
its treatment of Metalclad.263 It stated that "[p]romment in the statement of
principles and rules that introduces [NAFTA] is the reference to
'transparency' referring that the principle of transparency thus extends to a
NAFTA Party's obligations under Chapter 1 1-type investment. 264 The tribunal
noted that at all times Metalclad operated construction of the landfill with
reassurance from federal authorities that it did not need approval from Guadalcazar
for the project.265 Consequently, the tribunal held:
The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or
procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction
permit, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency
254. Id. In 44-45.
255. Id. 146.
256. Id. 1 47-48. Metalclad agreed to correct certain "deficiencies" existing at the landfill site, to
set aside a significant portion of its land for animal conservation purposes, to provide free medical
advice to citizens of Guadalcazar, to give employment and training preferences to citizens of
Guadalcazar, to give the city a discount for disposal of the city's hazardous waste and to consult with
citizens and government authorities regarding issues arising from the operation of the landfill. Id. 1 48.
257. Id. T 56.
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required by NAFTA.
266
The tribunal pointed out that Guadalcazar denied Metalclad's permit after
negotiation of the Convenio when construction was basically completed, and did
not notify Metalclad of the denial proceedings or afford Metalclad an opportunity
to be heard at those proceedings. 267  Metalclad was thus not given fair and
equitable treatment in accordance with international law standards imposed on
Mexico under in Chapter 11.268
According to the tribunal, it followed that Mexico violated Article 1 110
through "indirect expropriation" of Metalclad's investment by allowing
Guadalcazar to prevent operation of the landfill.269 In other words, Mexico's
actions were "tantamount to expropriation," in violation of Chapter 11.270 Further,
the tribunal found that, although such a ruling was not necessary, the Governor's
ecological decree covering Metalclad's land was itself "an act tantamount to
expropriation." 27 1 The tribunal then took into account a number of factors in
assessing damages. It noted that Metalclad had been deprived of its entire
investment, and assessed damages in the amount of the clairmant's actual
investment in the landfill operation.272
This assessment did not include future projected earnings, which Metalcad
demanded.273  The tribunal based its determination of "fair market value" on its
analysis of prior international arbitration investment disputes.274 In the end,
Metalclad was awarded almost $16.7 million in damages plus legal interest at a
monthly rate of six percent.275
Thereafter, Mexico filed a petition with the Supreme Court of British
Columbia asking the court to set aside the award. 276 Chapter 11 prohibits final
266. Id. 88. The tribunal found that under Mexican law, the federal government has authority
over projects for managing hazardous waste regardless of whether Metalclad needed approval from
Guadalcazar. Id. 9 82-86.
267. Id. 90-91. The tribunal further found that the permit denial "was denied without any
consideration of, or specific reference to, construction aspects or flaws of the physical facility. Id.
93. Moreover, the tribunal gave weight to the Conveno in holding that the project was not violative of
environmental concerns. Id. 9 98.
268. Id. 99-101.
269. Id. 9 104-07. The tribunal explained what "expropriation" means under Chapter Ii:
[E]xpropnation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged
takings of property but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the








276. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 644, [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359,
available at: www.naftaclaims.com (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter "Metalclad"].
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enforcement of an arbitral tribunal's award until "a court has dismissed or allowed
an application to revise, set aside or annul the award. 277 There is, of course, no
provision in NAFTA for appealing Chapter 11 arbitrations, but nothing m NAFTA
prevents Mexico from proceeding as it did. In determining what law it should
apply, the court reasoned that the International Commercial Arbitration Act was
applicable, given the international commercial nature of the investment dispute m
the Metalclad arbitration.278 The British Columbia court then noted that that Act
permitted the court to set aside the arbitration award only if the arbitral tribunal
decided issues outside the scope of the arbitration or if the award was against the
public policy of British Columbia.279
Under that standard of review, the court first dealt with the Article 1105
claim. It held that the minimum standard of treatment principle set forth in that
article is based on "customary international law," "developed by common practices
of countries, and is not based on "conventional international law which is
comprised of treaties ,,280 The court thus rejected the arbitral tribunal's finding
that Mexico violated Article 1105 based on lack of transparency, as "[n]o authority
was cited or evidence introduced to establish that transparency has become a part
of customary international law. ' , 2si The court then held that the tribunal's Article
1105 ruling "infected its analysis of Article 1110.,,282 Because the tribunal held
that Mexico's actions were "tantamount to expropriation" due in part to the
tribunal's flawed analysis regarding transparency, the court ruled that the tribunal
acted outside the scope of its mandate m ruling that Mexico violated Article
1110.283
At the end of the day, however, Metalclad prevailed. The court upheld the
tribunal's finding that the Governor's ecological decree was itself tantamount to
expropriation.28 It noted that the tribunal's broad definition of expropriation was a
question of law that the court could not review, and that the tribunal's finding of
expropriation based on the ecological decree was separate from its other flawed
findings and within its scope of review. 285 The court then dismissed Mexico's
arguments that Metalclad had acted improperly and against the public policy of
British Columbia by allegedly engaging in corruption, bribery and fraud m
277. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art 1136(b)(3)(ii). The British Columbia Court noted that neither
party contested the jurisdiction of the court given that the arbitration to place in Vancouver. Metalclad,
supra note 277, 39; see also Dodge, Metalclad, supra note 250, at 914-15 (discussing the Canadian
court's decision, noting that Mexico filed its suit in British Columbia because that is where the
arbitration took place).
278. Metalclad, supra note 277, 9 39-49.
279. Id. 50.
280. Id. 62.
281. Id. 68. The court found that the arbitral tribunal wrongly stated the applicable law in
inferring the requirement of transparency in NAFTA, and thus decided a matter outside the scope of its




285. Id. 9 94-99.
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pursuing its Chapter 11 claim.28 6
Mexico also argued that the award should be set aside on grounds that the
arbitral tribunal did not address all of Mexico's arguments.28 7 This argument was
also rejected, as the court found that the tribunal "adequately dealt with the
principle issues before it" and thus did not impair Mexico's case to warrant setting
aside the award.288 Lastly, the court modified Metalclad's damages according to
its holding, reducing the amount of interest Mexico owed on the award by fixing
the date of interest due on the award from the date of the ecological decree in
1997 rather than in 1995.289
4. Feldman v. United Mexican States
29°
Feldman differs significantly from the other Chapter 11 arbitrations discussed
thus far. It raised a variety of complex jurisdictional questions before the tribunal
could rule on the merits. Its complexity and in some instances incomplete factual
286. Id. M 106-118. The court found no evidence indicating such corruption or impropriety and
confirmed the findings of the arbitral tribunal with respect to those issues. Id.
287. Id. 119.
288. Id. 9 130.
289. Id. 137 The court also ordered Metalclad to pay seventy-five percent of Mexico's court
costs because Mexico prevailed in having the court set aside two of the tribunal's findings. Id.
Interestingly, Dodge makes the following observation regarding Metalclad:
One often thinks of courts as being concerned with setting precedents to guide future
conduct, and of arbitrators as being both less concerned with the content of the law and
more willing to fashion compromises to satisfy the parties. In Metalclad, however, those
roles were reversed. The arbitral tribunal tried hard to advance international law
concerning foreign investment by finding that "fair and equitable treatment" required
transparency and by adopting an expansive definition of expropriation. It was Justice
Tyson who gave each party what it wanted most-setting aside for Mexico the
transparency aspects of the award, while giving Metalclad most of its money More
broadly, the case may lead one to wonder whether it is appropriate to allow national
courts to review Chapter 11 awards.
Dodge, Metalclad, supra note 250, at 915-16.
Dodge goes on to argue that the Metalclad proceedings demonstrate the need for NAFTA Parties to
create an appellate body for Chapter II arbitrations. Id. at 918-19.
Interestingly, the court did not rule explicitly on whether Mexico had breached Articles 1105
and 1110, and held that Metalclad had the option of resubmitting its claims to the arbitral tribunal
regarding those issues, excluding any arguments regarding Mexico's alleged lack of transparency. Id. 9
136. In a supplemental decision, the Supreme Court of British Columbia confirmed its ruling to permit
Metaclad to resubmit certain claims to arbitration, and the court postponed its own adjournment until
the arbitral tribunal could rule on those claims in resubmission. United Mexican States v. Metalelad,
2001 BCSC 1529, 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169, 41 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 298, 18-19 (Sup. Ct. Brit. Col. 2001)
(additional reasons to (2001) 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (B.C.S.C.)). Mexico appealed the court's decision
not to set aside the award in whole. Id. 9. However, soon thereafter it abandoned its appeal. Mexico
v. Metalclad Corp., Notice of Abandonment of Appeal, Oct. 30, 2001, Case No. CA028568, Doe. No.
L002904, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited May 1, 2004).
290. Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Final Award
(Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/I/c375 l.htm (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter
"Feldman Award"]
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history291 also provide for a rather lengthy opinion. In April of 1999 Mr. Feldman
(a U.S. investor) filed a claim m arbitration against Mexico on behalf of his
Mexican corporation, Corporact6n de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V
("CEMSA"), which was a reseller/exporter of cigarettes produced m Mexico.
292
Mr. Feldman based his clami on Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110,293 requesting 475
million pesos ($50 million) in damages.
294
The dispute involved CEMSA's tremulous relations with the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit ("SHCP"). Mexico's tax laws Imposed a zero percent
tax rate on the resale of cigarettes produced in Mexico sold as exports as well as
granted rebates on the initial taxes the resellers/exporters paid to Mexican
producers or retailers, as long as the resellers met certain invoice requirements.
295
In essence, Mr. Feldman's claim arose from SHCP's refusal to rebate excise taxes
paid by CEMSA on its exported cigarettes, and SHCP's later denial of CEMSA's
export registration license.2 6
In fact, legal action between CEMSA and SHCP began before NAFTA even
took effect.297 CEMSA received rebates from 1990-91, but in 1991 the Mexican
Congress amended the tax laws to deny the rebates and the zero percent tax rate for
resellers of cigarettes.298 CEMSA then filed an Amparo petition in a Mexican
court challenging the validity of the legislation,29 later winning on appeal m
1993.
30 In that same year, however, SHCP "shut down" CEMSA's exports on
grounds that CEMSA could not provide separate, itemized invoices of domestic
taxes paid on cigarettes as required by Mexican law, even though it was impossible
for it to comply with the invoice requirement.3 °' SHCP soon after agreed to allow
CEMSA to export cigarettes at the zero percent tax rate, but refused to give it the
rebates.30 2 In 1996 and 1997 however, SHCP paid rebates to CEMSA despite the
fact that CEMSA could not produce the required invoices. 0 3
At the end of 1997 SHCP stopped rebate payments to CEMSA, and in 1998
Congress amended the tax laws, establishing that only "first-sale" retailers could
receive the rebates and that resellers had to register with the SHCP m order to get
the zero percent tax rate on cigarette exports.3 °4 SHCP then denied CEMSA's
registration request and demanded CEMSA to pay some $25 million in rebates that
291. Id. 96.





297. Id. I 11-26.
298. Id. I 9-10.
299. Id. I. CEMSA also filed a criminal complaint against certain SHCP officials alleging
abuse of authority and conspiracy in refusing rebates. Id.
300. Id. 916.
301. Id. 14. CEMSA could not comply with the invoice requirements because it did not have
access to the itemized invoices as a reseller-only producers had access to those invoices. Id. 15.
302. Id. 917
303. Id. 7I 19-20.
304. Id. 21.
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it had received.3 °5 CEMSA then filed an action in a Mexican court to stop SHCP
from assessing criminal sanctions on it.306 That case was still pending at the time
of the arbitration.3 °7
The arbitral tribunal first ruled on several preliminary jurisdictional issues. It
ruled that Mr. Feldman did have standing to bring the claun under Chapter 11 as a
U.S. citizen, even though he was a permanent resident of Mexico. 30 8 It also held
that the three-year time limit on Chapter 11 claims began to run in 1996 when
CEMSA experienced obstacles from the SHCP and therefore claimants'
arguments for relief from Mexico's action prior to 1996 were barred from
constderation.'0 9 Perhaps most interestingly, the tribunal held that it only had
jurisdiction to resolve the disputed matters insofar as they related to measures or
actions taken by Mexico after NAFTA became effective in 1994.3i0
The tribunal had jurisdiction despite CEMSA's pending action in a Mexican
court (regarding SHCP's claim for reimbursement of rebates). 3 " This was
because (1) Mexican law required CEMSA to respond in litigation to SHCP's
demand, and (2) CEMSA had since requested a termination of that litigation,
leaving Chapter 11 arbitration as its only real opportunity for remedy 312 The
tribunal also held that Mexico was estopped from arguing that CEMSA was not
entitled to rebates from 1996-97 for not complying with the invoice requirements,
precisely because SHCP had paid CEMSA despite the noncompliance and because
CEMSA could not possibly have complied.31 3 The arbitral tribunal conceded that
under Chapter 1 's broad investment protection framework, it is difficult to
determine whether certain government actions are "tantamount to
expropriation. ' 's t The tribunal concluded, in taking a variety of facts together as a
305. Id. 21-22.
306. Id. 22. Before that decision, however, Congress amended the challenged law to allow
resellers like CEMSA the rebates and favorable export tax rates. Id. 12-13.
307. Id.
308. Id. 48.
309. Id. 49. The tribunal rejected CEMSA's claim that the three-year time period should be tolled
so to include rebates that CEMSA did not get in the early 1990s. Id. 7 58.
310. Id. 51.
311. Id. % 67-68.
312. Id. T68.
313. Id. 59. The tribunal found reasoning for this in both Mexican law and international law, and
further proffered that "[t]he doctrine of estoppel, based on the fundamental legal interest in
predictability, reliance and consistency, is particularly important in the context of NAFTA, regime
designed to protect and promote trade and investment among the parties Id. 60.
314. Id. 100-101. The tribunal noted that "tax measures, even if they are designed to and have
the effect of an expropriation, will be indirect, with an effect that may be tantamount to expropriation.
Id. 101. Further, the issue of whether such regulatory measures are expropriation is a fact-specific
inquiry. Id. 102. The tribunal summarized the thin line between domestic tax policy and Chapter II
obligations:
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental authorities may force
company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business,
are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or
necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others,
have been considered to be expropnatory actions. At the same time, governments must
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whole, that SHCP's denial of excise tax rebates to CEMSA was not "creeping
expropriation" In violation of Article 1110.' s The tribunal explained that,
although the claimant experienced "great difficulties" as a result of the
government's conduct, that conduct did not amount to a violation of Chapter 11 16
Also, the changes in tax laws adversely affecting claimant were found not to be
prohibited by Chapter 11, as NAFTA Parties have broad discretion over their
respective tax policies.
31 7
Further, NAFTA does not require Mexico to create a market for resellers like
CEMSA to export cigarettes, and in fact Mexico may have a legitimate public
policy reason for limiting such activity 318 The tribunal held that Mexico did not
destroy claimant's investment by refusing to pay CEMSA the excise tax rebates, as
CEMSA continued to generate profit through the benefit of the zero percent tax
rate on exports of its cigarettes. 319 CEMSA still has control of its business. 320 As
to claimant's Article 1105 claim, the tribunal noted that such a claim was not
directly available because the dispute involved a tax measure, and further, an
Article 1105 violation could not be Inferred here because there was no Article
be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new or
modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or
increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable
governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely




316. Id. 113. The tribunal cited Azinman in its discussion:
To paraphrase Azintan, not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or
impossible for an investor to carry out particular business, change in the law or change
in the application of existing laws thatmakes it uneconomical to continue a particular
business, is an expropriation under Article 1110.
Id. 112.
317. Id. 116. Additionally, the tribunal held that the 1993 Mexican court decision regarding the
unconstitutionality of the tax laws pertained only to CEMSA's ability to receive the zero percent tax
rate. Id. IM 120-128. Because CEMSA could not comply with the invoice requirements, it really never
had "right" to the rebates in the first place for purposes of complaining of expropriation. Id. The
tribunal also made reference to previous Chapter II arbitrations against Mexico in dismissing some of
claimant's arguments. It rejected claimant's argument that the lack of transparency in SHCP
procedures was grounds for a Chapter 11 violation, refermng specifically to the decision by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia in Metalclad. Id. 133. It also rejected claimant's argument that it had been
denied justice in Mexico. Id. 139. CEMSA had continued access to Mexican courts throughout the
1990s, and like the claimants in Azinian, claimants here made no argument that the decisions of the
Mexican courts violated NAFTA. Id. 139.
318. Id. 115-16.
319. id. 119. The Mexican law at issue required cigarette exporters to submit their paid taxes on
separate invoices so that tax authorities could determine amounts subject to rebate. Id. 15. CEMSA
did not do this because it was apparently impossible for it to do so because of the means by which it
purchased its cigarettes from first sellers. Id. 17. CEMSA argued that for several years SHCP
accepted this despite the technical flaw. Id. In 18-19. The tribunal did not find invalid the law
requiring the claimant to provide separate invoices for tax purposes invalid. Id. 129.
320. Id. 142.
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1110 violation.32'
In discussing CEMSA's Article 1102 claun, however, the tribunal reached a
different result. Under Chapter I I's national treatment requirement, the issue was
"whether rebates have in fact been provided for domestically owned cigarette
exporters while denied to a foreign re-seller, CEMSA[,]" because "Mexico is of
course entitled to strictly enforce its laws but it must do so in a non-discrinmmatory
manner, as between foreign investors and domestic mvestors. '" 322 The tribunal
found that other Mexican resellers of cigarettes had received rebates and did not
experience any problems with obtaining export licenses from SHCP even though
those resellers could not comply with the mvoice requirements for rebates.323 In
accordance with its reasoning regarding the Article 11 10 claim, the tribunal held
that different treatment of producers and resellers of cigarettes in Mexico does not
violate international law, because Mexico may have legitimate public policy
reasons for doing so.
324
However, Mexico violated Article 1102 when SHCP gave other similarly
situated domestic cigarette resellers rebates but denied the same rebates to
CEMSA, even though the domestic resellers could not comply with the invoice
requirements either-this was defacto discrimination according to the tribunal.32
Interestingly, the tribunal admitted that the evidence of discrimination was weak,
but ultimately decided that the claimant's argument carried the day because
Mexico was unable to refute the allegations with any tangible evidence.326 Thus,
in its lengthy analysis, the tribunal gave great deference to Mexico's authority over
its own tax policies, and found a violation under the national treatment standards
rather than under the expropriation provisions, which amounted to far less
damages.
In assessing damages, the tribunal reasoned that the drafters of NAFTA did
not provide much guidance for valuating damages other than a fair market value
standard for expropriation, signaling confidence in the fact that Chapter 11
tribunals are competent to make such a determination.327 The tribunal held that
321. Id. 1141.
322. Id. 169 (emphasis in original).
323. Id. 99 154.
324. Id. 135-36.
325. Id. 173, 184-88. The tribunal also pointed out that CEMSA was the only reseller that
SHCP audited, which further evinced discnimmatory treatment. Id. 9 174.
326. Id. IN 176, 186. Notably, the tribunal stated that "[tihe majority's view is based first on the
conclusion that the burden of proof was shifted from the Claimant to the Respondent, with the
Respondent then failing to meet its new burden, and on an assessment of the record as a whole. Id.
176.
One tribunal member, however, took an opposing viewpoint In his dissent, Mr. Bravo agreed
with the award except for the finding of discnmmation and hence violation of Article 1102. Marvin
Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/88/1, 1 1, Dissenting Opinion, ( Dec. 16,
2002). available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3751.htm (last visited May 1, 2004). Specifically, Mr.
Bravo argued that claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence that domestic resellers of cigarettes
received sporadic rebates like the claimants, and in fact read the record to indicate that domestic
resellers went through similar hurtles with the SHCP Id. 6.
327 Feldman Award, supra note 291, 194-98.
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claimant's damages for Mexico's Article 1102 breach should be for claimant's
"loss adequately connected with the breach. 3 28 Here, there was no expropriation
and claimant's argument for lost profits was not persuasive given its continued
operation; rather, the only issue regarding damages was the total amount of the
rebates wrongly withheld from CEMSA.329 The tribunal then awarded claimant
16.9 million pesos plus interest, and ordered each party to pay its own costs
because each party was successful in part. 30 The award was substantially less than
the 475 million pesos m damages that Mr. Feldman requested. Mexico
subsequently petitioned the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to set aside the
tribunal's award, however, the court denied the petition and ruled that the tribunal
did not act outside its scope.33'
At this point it should be clear that for Mexico Chapter I1 represents quite a
departure from its traditional approach to international law and investment, and
that the elaborate design of Chapter 11 presents, m the very least, an objective and
alternative approach to international law and foreign investment. 332 The question
that remains is whether Chapter 11 dispute resolution ultimately serves as a benefit
or as a detriment to Mexico.
IV CHAPTER 11 AND MEXICO: THREATENING SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY 9
The text of Chapter 11 and its application are the critical sources for testing
the validity of the concerns with Chapter 11, and then for addressing the real
implications for Mexico. This is a less abstract method of deciphering the reality
behind Chapter 11 dispute resolution, and it is a good way to emphasize the
purposes and positive implications of Chapter 11 for Mexico. Overall, this
analysis supports the argument that the broad concerns with Chapter 11 are
unfounded. Indeed, while a few concerns are noteworthy and while some critics m
the very least offer some pragmatic suggestions for possible reform, most of the
criticisms are unsubstantiated.333 Most Importantly, the following discussion also
illustrates how international law is a positive force in the governance of economic
integration in Mexaco as well as for Mexico's future participation in the
328. Id. 194.
329. Id. In 199-202.
330. Id. 205-08.
331. United Mexican States v. Karpa, [2003] CarswellOnt 4929 (Sup. Ct. Ont 2003) (Doc. No. 03-
CV-23500).
332. For more discussion on the intricacies of Chapter 11 arbitration, see Frederick M. Abbott, The
Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North
American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP L. REV. 303, 305 (2000); Justin Byrne, NAFTA
Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 415,422-23 (2000); Camp, supra note 5, at 86-7.
333. One NAFTA commentator candidly asserts that "[sbo much attention has been paid to the
phantoms and foibles of investor-state arbitration that its very purpose appears to have been overlooked
by both its opponents and the governments that originally agreed to its placement in the NAFTA.
Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law, 2 Bus. L.
Int'l 158 (2002), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
"Weiler, NAFTA Investment"].
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international political economy.
Concerns with Chapter II emanate, at base, from the fact that Chapter 11
provides for binding international arbitration for the resolution of investment
disputes between private investors and NAFTA Parties. Notably, the literature on
Chapter 1 1 illustrates the debate between critics and proponents of NAFTA
Chapter 11 in general, as applied to all NAFTA Parties.334 And, most of the
criticisms of Chapter II stem from two major general assertions: Chapter I I is a
threat to national sovereignty and is an abrogation of democracy 335 The most
often-cited arguments for this are that Chapter 11 promotes frivolous litigation and
permits disproportionate compensation, lacks an adequate award review process,
uses "secret" tribunals to reduce transparency, prevents legitimate governmental
regulation, and derogates from notions of equality and sustainable development.
336
With respect to Mexico, these concerns are summarized and dealt with below.
A. Frivolous Litigation and Disproportionate Compensation
One argument against Chapter 1 1 is that it opens up NAFTA Parties to
meritless, excessive litigation brought by market-hungry foreign corporations bent
on using direct access to control their piece of the market share m a NAFTA Party.
337 This i turn is costly for NAFTA Parties and acts as a check on the
governments' ability to regulate, which infringes upon national sovereignty and
principles of democratic governance.338  More than one commentator has
suggested that NAFTA Parties establish some sort of screening mechamsm, and
Jones has specifically stated that such a mechanism would be useful "to diminish
the ability of powerful U.S. companies to take advantage of a weaker Mexican
government and would provide a level playing field for private investors from all
three NAFTA countries. ' 339 Indeed, one would think that if the result of Chapter
11 has been to encourage finvolous lawsuits, Mexico would be experiencing the
brunt of those suits.
First, however, the text of Chapter 11 reveals that an investor must go through
various procedural requirements in order to utilize the Chapter 11 mechanism
against a NAFTA Party 340 These requirements on their face seem to dispel any
concern that Chapter 11 grants investors free, unconditional opportunities to bring
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Jones, supra note 184, at 545-46; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434; Public Citizen, "NAFTA
Chapter II Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy, available at http://www.citizen.org/
publicationslrelease.cfm?iD=7076 (last visited Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter "Public Citizen"]; Daniel M.
Price, NAFTA Chapter II Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve? 26 CAN.
U.S. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) [hereinafter "Price, Safety Valve"]; Ian Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken
Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223,226 (2001).
337. Jones, supra note 184, at 545-46; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434; Public Citizen, supra note
337; Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 8; Ian Laird, supra note 337, at 226.
338. See Jones, supra note 184, at 543.
339. Id. at 546; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434.
340. See supra notes 178-82.
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frivolous litigation against NAFTA Parties. Even more, the text encourages
dispute resolution through consultation and negotiation before the arbitration
provision is invoked.34 1 For Mexico, this promotes dialogue between a foreign
investor and Mexican authorities so that foreign investment can flourish in a
friendly environment, but in one that is politically acceptable to Mexican
authorities, who are ultimately responsible to their citizens. 42
Second, the facts also refute the criticism that Chapter 11 gives investors the
opportunity to bring frivolous actions against Mexico and take advantage of
Mexico's weaker economic status compared to its NAFTA counterparts. After
eight years of NAFTA, less than ten claims have been filed against Mexico.
343
There has been no evidence of an onslaught of U.S. or Canadian-based
corporations seekmg to use direct access dispute resolution as a means to trample
Mexico's legitimate governance and obtain a greater market share. This in and of
itself dispels the criticism that Chapter I 1 has encouraged frivolous litigation and
opens up Mexico to the mercy of litigious North American investors. The bottom
line here is that there has not been excessive use of Chapter 11 against Mexico.
Moreover, regarding those arbitrations that have proceeded against Mexico so far,
Chapter 11 tribunals have scrutinized investors' adherence to the various
jurisdictional requirements that must be met before an investor could proceed.
The tribunal's analysis in Azinian indicates that Chapter 11 is not to be
exploited by private investors. 3 " NAFTA Parties designed Chapter 11 for the
purpose of protecting and thus stimulating investment activity in order to achieve
greater economic integration. The tribunal's analysis lends direct support to the
competence of a Chapter 11 tribunal to ensure those purposes and guide the
dispute resolution process, and not to permit investor evasion of Mexican courts
where legal actions beyond that which set forth in Chapter 11 should be taken.
The competence of the tribunal to scrutinize these jurisdictional requirements
provides further evidence that frivolous litigation against Mexico, in application, is
not a reality
In Waste Management, the tribunal properly applied Annex 1137.1 of Chapter
11, which specifically protects Mexico against parallel or excessive litigation.345
This is important because it supports the idea that investors must follow the rules
in bringing legal action against Mexico. Mexico has abandoned its traditional
policy regarding foreign investment and made a commitment to rules, despite its
historically skeptical view of foreign investors. Investors must comply with the
rules for bringing Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico. As evidenced in Waste
Management, Chapter 11 in application does protect Mexico from the costs and
burden of excessive litigation with foreign investors.3 46  It also curtails any
perceived advantage an investor may have in bringing actions against Mexico in
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See State Department Website, supra note 198.
344. See Azinian Award, supra note 201.
345. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, § 27
346. Id.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
both arbitration and Mexican courts, m that an investor does not have two chances
to prevail on its claim.
3 47
Feldman supports the argument that a Chapter 11 tribunal engages in
sophisticated legal analysis to decipher whether it has jurisdiction according the
NAFTA. 348  There, Mexico appropriately was not subjected to retroactive
liability 349 Moreover, the investor's claim was narrowed so as to comport with the
tune limit requirements of Chapter 11, and thus Mexico was protected from
possibly paying for the claimant's lack of following the rules. 350 These objective,
balanced conclusions of the tribunal encourage a framework within which
investment and potential compensation for damages to that investment m Mexico
are to be determined with prudence. Such prudence coincides with both the
economic reality of the investment as well as the protection of Mexico from
improper claims.
Third, Weiler comments that an investor must take into account the political
costs of bringing a frivolous lawsuit against a NAFTA Party, as such action could
taint the investor's reputation and future prospects for mvestment. 351 This is
particularly true in the case of Mexico, where history has not been kind to the
reputation of foreign investors. 2  Even more, Price points out that there is a
possibility of frivolous lawsuits in every legal system, every day, but that does not
threaten democracy or sovereignty 353 Again, there has not been excessive use of
Chapter 1 1 against Mexico. Moreover, the text of Chapter 11 and the need of
foreign investors to maintain a good reputation in Mexican markets provide
adequate checks for potentially frivolous litigation. In this respect, a screening
mechanism for Chapter I I disputes is simply not necessary.
Another related criticism of Chapter 1 1 is that the potential damage award
amounts could be astronomical even when there is a legitimate government
measure taken for the protection of society, and thus foreign investors should not
be able to claim such high amounts because taxpayers ultimately foot the bill.
354
Here, the argument seems to be that no compensation, or rather, some nominal
compensation, is in order if a government legitimately acts to remedy a public
problem, regardless of whether the investment is wiped out totally.
First, Brower correctly asserts that Chapter 11 minimizes the inherent risk
NAFTA Parties face in balancing regulation of foreign investment by eliminating
347. Id.
348. Feldman Award, supra note 294, 47.
349. Id. 51.
350. Id. IM 57-58.
351. Weiler, NAFTA Investment, supra note 334, at 158 n.3.
352. See supra Part II.B.I.
353. See Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 8. Price opines that "rather than being a threat to
sovereignty, NAFTA checks the excesses of unilateral exercises of sovereignty by testing measures
against generally accepted public international law standards. Id. at 7
354. Laird, supra note 337, at 228-29; Brower II, supra. note 13, at 80; Public Citizen, supra note
337" "Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy, February 5, 2002, 10:00pm (ET), PBS, transcrpt
available at http://www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/CH__1 I/articles.cfm?D=6687 (last visited Feb. 26,
2003) [hereinafter "Moyers"].
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the possibility of punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.3 5 Also, Laird
appropriately mentions the difficulty an investor faces in making a case for high
damages under principles of international law, where the purpose of compensation
is what makes an investor whole as measured by the value of the investment "the
day before the expropriation, not after. 35 6
This is particularly true where a NAFTA Party legitimately acts to protect the
public from a "hazardous" investment, because "if the product or investment is
legitimately a health or environmental hazard, and this was known before the
expropriation, it would be difficult to assert that on the day of expropriation the
investment had any value. 3 57 These realities seem to dispel the argument that
Chapter II promotes disproportionate compensation at the expense of tax payers.
As for Mexico, the Chapter 11 arbitrations demonstrate that it is difficult to make a
case for high damages, and that Chapter II tribunals have been exercising a high
degree of sophistication regarding damages.
With respect to Azmnan, an important point is that Mexico did not have to pay
damages after successfully arguing its case before a neutral tribunal.'5 8 The
tribunal quickly dismissed the inappropriate claim of $16 million in damages,
without really even discussing the claim on the merits. 9 This is important for the
development of the rule of law in Mexico as well as among NAFTA Parties and
private individuals doing business m North America. It sends a signal to investors
that Mexico is willing to play by the rules, and it sends a signal to Mexico that
when it is in the right it can use the international system and international law to its
advantage and reap the benefits of increased foreign investment at the same time.
Moreover, this reality in application refutes concerns that the Chapter 11 dispute
resolution framework gives "implausible investors" the ability to "bankrupt"
Mexican democracy
In Metalclad, the tribunal awarded the investor $16.7 million for Mexico's
breach of Chapter 11, this instead of the $43 million in damages claimants
demanded.3s ' In this respect, little clout can be given to the argument that the
tribunal was not careful in its damage calculation to decipher what part of
claimant's demand was inflated and non-compensable under Chapter 11. The idea
that investors can obtain disproportionate compensation for investment losses m
Mexico did not hold in application here. Further, Feldman represents an
appropriate distinction in that Chapter 11 seeks to encourage investment and
compensate damages to such investment, but only to the extent that compensation
is fair and makes economic sense.3 6 ' The tribunal was careful not to allow
conditions in which the investor could receive a windfall, subjecting Mexico to the
355. Brower II, supra note 13, at 80.
356. Laird, supra note 337, at 228.
357. Id. at 228.
358. See Azinian Award, supra note 201.
359. Id. 196-200.
360. Metalclad Award, supra note 250, at 131.
361. See Feldman Award, supra note 291, 189-207.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
36
possibility of paying disproportionate compensation.62 When Feldman is
considered alongside Metalcad, it is difficult to say, even in those cases where
Mexico has been required to compensate foreign investors, that Chapter 1 1 has
subjected Mexico to disproportionate compensation to the detriment of the public.
B. Lack of Review Process
Another common criticism of Chapter 11, and one that has been put forth in
particular by NAFTA Parties, attacks the binding nature of arbitral decisions.
363
Abbot questions whether democratic NAFTA Parties and their citizens should be
"comfortable" with arbitral decisions given that there is no appellate review
process, and he suggests that NAFTA Parties establish an appellate body or
provide national courts with more of a role in Chapter 11 arbitrations.36 Brower
and Steven note the criticism by Canada and Mexico that tribunals "may not make
the right decisions, and therefore an appellate review process is necessary 365
It may be said that the argument for an appellate review mechanism for
Chapter 11 arbitrations is a pragmatic suggestion to a concern for more
transparency m the dispute resolution process.366 First, however, regardless of
whether an appellate review process is politically necessary or even a viable option
for NAFTA Parties, Chapter 1 1 is not a threat to democracy because it lacks an
appellate review mechanism per se.367 A NAFTA Party may petition a court to
modify or set aside an award if it believes a Chapter 11 tribunal acted outside its
scope--outside the requirements of NAFTA in making a ruling.36 A NAFTA
Party therefore potentially has access to both a highly-sophisticated arbitration
tribunal as well as the courts of a particular NAFTA Party in a given dispute.
Metalclad demonstrates that NAFTA Parties have some type of recourse to a
court system for review of a Chapter 11 award, although critics do not mention
this. 69 It demonstrates that, even if one agrees that Chapter 1 1 arbitral awards
should be reviewed, a NAFTA Party can n fact get review of a Chapter 11
362. See id.
363. Abbott, supra note 333, at 308; Brower I, supra note 13, at 47.
364. Abbott, supra note 333, at 308.
365. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 200.
366. Pending trade promotion authority legislation in the U.S. Congress calls for the establishment
of an appellate review mechanism to review decisions rendered by international arbitration panels in
investor-state disputes ansing out of trade/investment agreements. CRS Report to Congress, Trade
Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority: Summary and Analysis of Selected Major Provisions of H.R. 3005,
April 15, 2002, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10090.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2003) [hereinafter "TPA"]. Interestingly, in an effort to bring greater transparency to the foreign
investment dispute resolution process, the United States and Chile have left open the possibility for
establishing an appellate mechanism for arbitration brought under the foreign investment chapter in the
Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, Chapter 10, at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/final/lO.tnvestment.PDF (last visited May 1, 2004).
367. TPA, supra note 369.
368. Jones, supra note 184, at 536.
369 Metalclad, supra note 277
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award. 370 There, Mexico received the full benefit of the process by prevailing on
two of its arguments. Further, the British Columbia court served not only as a
check on the tribunal's reasoning, but also on the damage calculation.372 The court
modified the damage award amount only slightly to correspond with its
reasoning, 373 which gives further weight to the argument that Chapter II tribunals
are sophisticated and fair when calculating damages against Mexico.
Second, in striking the balance between the need for economic efficiency and
legal certainty, NAFTA Parties chose to side with finality over appellate litigation.
One economic rationale behind this is to deal with an investment dispute in a
neutral forum when it arises and move on, which lessens the likelihood of pending
litigation mhibitmg decisions to invest. Maintaining a steady flow of investment in
Mexico is of course critical to building long term growth. Mexico has successfully
used the two-tiered investment dispute review system and it continues to
experience the benefit of increased foreign investment.3 74 The Chapter 11 dispute
resolution system is working.
In line with this, Brower adds a more abstract argument against appellate
review of Chapter 11 arbitral awards, stating that
heightened judicial review "constitutes an independent violation of Chapter
11. Although heightened review might not, for technical and political reasons,
subject the NAFTA Parties to additional claims for liability, it undermines the
pnnciple of voluntary compliance with authoritative decisions rendered at the
international level by impartial bodies charged with the supervision of treaty
compliance. Thus, heightened judicial review impairs the development of the rule
of law in international economic relations." 375
Thus, if an appellate review mechanism is established, it is possible that Mexico
could be given a small window of opportunity to shy away from its commitment to
comply m all cases with international law, which would hurt its prospects for
economic growth. For Mexico, old ways should not be given a chance to surface
and trump Mexico's commitment toward progress in law and economic policy
since NAFTA.
Third, it is important to emphasize again, as Brower adds, that the expertise of
the tribunals far exceeds that of the courts in NAFTA Parties.37 6 The notion that
Mexico or any NAFTA Party cannot be "comfortable" with an arbitration decision,
given the expertise and the option to get a second review in a domestic trial court,
is unfounded. A close analysis of the arbitrations involving Mexico so far further
underscores the soplhstication, expertise and prudence of the tribunals in sifting
through the facts of the investment disputes and applying the law to make
370. See id.




375. Brower II, supra note 13, at 47
376. Id. at 78.
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decisions. This approach facilitates Mexico's economic goals.
Azinian demonstrates the high degree of sophistication in the tribunal's
analysis, discerning if an investor has a cause of action under Chapter 11 and
whether what the investor alleged is something outside the scope of the tribunal's
competence.377 The complex factual history in Feldman and the tribunal's intricate
analysis of the interlacing of previous court proceedings, tax issues and
government regulations in that dispute further underscores the sophistication of
Chapter 11 tribunals.378 In Waste Management, the tribunal's sophisticated
analysis of the jurisdictional requirements of Chapter 11 lends support to the idea
that the tribunals are highly competent adjudicators and have a sophisticated
knowledge of international law.379 Mexico prevailed on its first jurisdictional
objection, in line with the purpose of Chapter 11 to protect Mexico from excessive
litigation.380 The investors prevailed in round two, but they did so according to
international law.3 8i Another benefit to Mexico here is that Mexico has taken part
in the development of the rule of law among NAFTA Parties and it has made
important arguments, some of which have been successful. In other words,
Mexico now has a stake in the Chapter 11 process and an important role in the
development of international law pertaming to foreign investment.38 2 And this is
all being done through a highly competent adjudication system.
An additional comment on the adequacy of the dispute resolution framework
as is and Mexico's participation in establishing the rule of law under Chapter 11
dispute resolution is important here. Although Chapter 11 arbitrations have no
precedential value, the tribunal in Feldman stated that its decision regarding
Article 1110 was consistent with the decisions in Metalclad, Azinian and other
decisions. 38 3  This reference is both good for international law and foreign
investment. It allows NAFTA Parties to acknowledge a common set of rules in
developing the rule of law pertaining to North American investment activity, and it
further adds to a more predictable legal environment for investors, which promotes
investment. This in turn promotes deeper integration. Further, this reference
supports the idea that even though there is no official appellate review process,
Chapter 11 tribunals have sought "guidance" in prudently rendering their
decisions. 39
C. "Secret" Tribunals
Critics of Chapter II also complain of the confidential nature of international
arbitration. 3 5  Public interest groups and non-governmental organizations in
377 Azintan Award, supra note 201, 81-86.
378. Feldman Award, supra note 291, 6-23, 105-112.
379. Waste Management II Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 240, 26-37.
380. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, § 31.
381. See Waste Management I1 Junsdiction Decision, supra note 240.
382. See id.
383. Feldman Award, supra note 291, 107.
384. See td.
385. See Jones, supra note 184, at 549; Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11
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particular denounce the Chapter I1 process because, m line with international
arbitration practice, it does not have any provisions for non-government third party
386participation. The Chapter 11 dispute resolution process has been described as
occurring "not in courts of law but before secret trade tribunals. 387 Others contest
the principle of confidentiality in international arbitrations entirely, and
vehemently oppose the confidentiality of NAFTA dispute settlement on grounds
that investors must assume that documents will be made public for purposes of
accountability to democratic governments.3s  In a more pragmatic tone, Jones
recommends the implementation of mechanisms through which non-governmental
organizations can access the proceedings.389
Whether or not Chapter 11 arbitrations should be more transparent with
respect to third-party participation is certainly an issue for debate, but it is a
misnomer to label the process as "secret. First, non-disputing NAFTA Parties
may submit their interpretations of the law in a given dispute to a tribunal. 390 It Is
the NAFTA Parties, after all, who have the responsibility to monitor
implementation and interpretation of NAFTA. 391 They do have access to influence
Chapter 11 tribunals, even if they are not a party to the dispute. Also, there are
provisions for expert witnesses, which further increases the opportunity for outside
mfluences, where proper, to inform better the dispute resolution process in a
particular case. 39
Second, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a clarification statement
of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, explaining that nothing in NAFTA
precludes a Chapter 11 tribunal from accepting amicus curiae submissions.' 9
Third, the argument for more public participation should be balanced with what
others point out regarding confidentiality-that confidentiality m Chapter 11
arbitrations is an essential element in promoting international law along side
foreign investment. 394 Lontz notes that the confidential nature of the arbitrations
serves as an incentive for both parties to submit important documents regarding the
investment dispute that would otherwise not come out in open court.395 The
Arbitrations, 2 CI. J. INT'L L. 213, 217 (2001); Lontz, supra note 69, at 539; Maximo Romero
Jimenez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213,217 (2001); Public Citizen,
supra note 337; Moyers, supra note 357.
386. See Public Citizen, supra note 337; Moyers, supra note 357" Abbott, supra note 333, at 308.
387 Moyers, supra note 357.
388. Fracassi, supra note 388, at 217, 221-22.
389. Jones, supra note 184, at 549.
390. NAFTA, supra note 10, at 645.
391. Id. at 645.
392. Id. at 646.
393. Unofficial Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation, Oct.
7, 2003, available at http//:www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2OO3/statement-
nondisputingparties.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). For example, in United Parcel Service of America
v. Canada, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organzaton/6033.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2004), the Chapter II tribunal accepted written briefs by non-disputing parties.
394. See Camp, supra note 5, at 91-92, Laird, supra note 337, at 225, and Jimenez, supra note 388,
at 250.
395. Lontz, supra note 69, at 539.
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advantages gamed from limited outside intervention in foreign investment
disputes, both with respect to future investment and to the facilitation of dispute
resolution, are perhaps an advantage for Mexico in particular.
The Chapter 11 framework allows Mexico to be forthcoming m the resolution
of disputes without potentially sending a negative signal to foreign investors who
may perceive a disputed governmental measure, although not fully adjudicated, as
a rsk. This, in turn, could cause capital flight, which is not what Mexico wants
3 96
Also, Mexico has and will take measures that are violative of an investor's right
under Chapter 11, and those measures should be dealt with in a way that does not
scare capital inflows while Mexico adjusts to the international rule-based system of
dispute resolution under Chapter 11.
Critics also attack the fact that Annex 1137 4 of NAFTA allows either a
disputing Party or a disputing investor the choice of whether to make the arbitral
award public.397 However, all final arbitral awards involving Mexico thus far have
been published. 398 Further, most documents involving the arbitrations are readily
available on the Internet. 399 Lack of transparency in this respect is simply not the
reality, and the potential economic benefit of a certain degree of confidentially
arguably substantiates a delay in releasing documents to the public. This is not to
say that this is not an area where potential reform of Chapter 11 dispute resolution
may be proper for political purposes. It is just to say that there are strong
economic arguments to the contrary, particularly with regard to Mexico.
D. Prevents Government Regulation
An overriding criticism of Chapter 11, which is related to those discussed
above but is important on its own, is that Chapter II prevents a NAFTA Party
from effectively taking measures to protect the public health and the
environment.40 The argument is, at base, that investors can deter or unfairly make
396. John H. Chun, Annual Survey Issue: International Insolvencies: NOTE. "Post-Modern
Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum? 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2647, 2647-2659 (1996).
397 NAFTA, supra note 10, at annex 1137.4.
398. State Department Website, supra note 198; Weiler Website, supra note 198.
399. Id. It should be noted that NAFTA Parties have released an interpretation of the text regarding
publication of awards, emphasizing that nothing in NAFTA prevents the release of Chapter I I
arbitration documents to the public. State Department Website, supra note 198. Also, although
discussion of Chapter I I arbitrations not involving Mexico is outside the scope of this article, the
parties to the Chapter I I arbitration United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, supra note 396, have
decided to hold the arbitration open to the public via closed circuit television. ICSID Website, supra
note 135, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
400. Jones, supra note 184, at 555; Abbott, supra note 333, at 309; Laird, supra note 337, at 227-
29; Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 198; Public Citizen, supra note 337 Moyers, supra note 357;
Vendiendo El Futuro: Un documento preparado por la Comision de Asuntos Sociales (CCCB-CECC)
en vistas a la conferenica Humamzando la Economia Global, Presentada en La Universidad de
Cat6lica de Amdrica, Washington, D.C., Enero 28 al 30, 2002, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/futuroGerardoTranslation.final.PDF (last visited Mar. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter "Vendiendo El Futuro"].
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governments pay for legitimate government regulation, all in the name of money
For critics, this is a major intrusion on national sovereignty and democratic
401governance. Jones voices his concern regarding environmental regulation and
asserts that direct access "tips the scales too far for investors. 40 2 In fact, with
respect to Mexico, these criticisms are very similar to the justifications Mexico put
forth throughout the twentieth century for rejecting the application of international
law to commercial disputes m Mexico involving foreigners.03
A plain reading of the Chapter 11 text seems to indicate something quite
contrary to the argument that Chapter 11 prevents legitimate government
regulation. Article 1114 deliberately protects a government's right to regulate-it
does not prevent such a right.4°4 Further, Loritz emphasizes that both a close
reading of Chapter 11 and international law supports the legal conclusion that "the
negative economic impact of environmental regulations does not trigger
liability. '405  Brower and Steven also acknowledge critics' sentiments that
corporate interests can 'undermine' legitimate governmental regulations in a
'supranational' forum insulated from the usual domestic political and legal
processes, and respond by properly pomtmg out it is basic customary international
law that states are responsible for indirect expropriation.4°
It is here where Chapter 11 strikes a balance for all NAFTA Parties as the
governments of those countries address the needs of their citizens. Those needs
include not only necessary public health and environmental legislation, but also an
environment where investment can flourish and economic livelihood can prosper.
At base, Chapter 11 gives a qualified investor the right to argue a claim before a
neutral tribunal.4 07 The investor still has to argue its case-there is no blanket right
for investors to strip away categorically a NAFTA Party's right to enact
legislation.
Further, the tribunal cannot prevent implementation of a challenged regulation
during the dispute.40 8  And, if a violation is found, the tribunal cannot force a
NAFTA Party to change its laws.4°  Chapter 11 just requires that a foreign
investor be treated according to international standards of fairness and that when
that does not happen, a NAFTA Party must compensate the investor
accordingly 410 This stands in stark contrast to the lack of investment rules in place
during the Porfinato in Mexico, and hence the threat of foreign investors indirectly
401. Public Citizen, supra note 337" Moyers, supra note 357- Vendiendo El Futuro, supra note
403; Abbott, supra note 333, at 309 (arguing that Chapter II does not take into account social policies
and thus tribunal review should be further limited until the parties establish a more sufficient dispute
resolution structure to account for government regulation).
402. Jones, supra note 184, at 556.
403. See supra Part II.B.I.
404. See supra note 170.
405. Loritz, supra note 69, at 551.
406. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 198.
407. See supra note 175.
408. See supra note 190.
409. Id.
410. See supra Part III.B.
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controlling Mexico's social policies is non-existent.
41 1
The arbitrations discussed hereto reveal the balance in Chapter 11 between
government regulation and the protection of investment. In Metalclad, both the
tribunal and the Canadian court found that Mexico did in fact indirectly
expropriate claimants' investment through the ecological decree. 2 This entitled
the claimants to money damages for their loss, but in the end the State of San Luis
Potosi and Guadalcazar were successful in their goal to shut down the landfill.413
In effect, Chapter 11 dispute resolution here did not prevent local Mexican
governments from doing what was the political will.
In Feldman, the tribunal's reasoning represents a careful analysis of NAFTA.
The tribunal appropriately disallowed a Chapter 11 claim to impede Mexico's right
to regulate its own tax policy.4 1 4  Further, in accordance with its reasoning
regarding the Article 1110 claim, the tribunal held that different treatment of
producers and resellers of cigarettes m Mexico does not violate international law,
because Mexico may have legitimate public policy reasons for doing so. 4 15 Here,
the tribunal showed great deference to the legitimate authority of Mexico to
govern, and did not impose restrictions on Mexico that are not in NAFTA. In
application, therefore, critics' argument that Chapter 11 dispute resolution
categorically strips NAFTA Parties' rights to regulation is not the case. The
tribunal m Feldman was careful to distinguish between an investor's rights under
Chapter 11 and a government's rights and responsibilities in a democratic
society 416
Additionally, Laird points out that the obligation to compensate expropriated
investment according to international standards is a "small price to pay" for the
overall benefits of free trade and open investment.417 This, of course, is especially
so for Mexico, which as emphasized throughout this article needs a predictable,
stable legal climate to encourage foreign investment. Laird further summarizes,
most appropriately, that "governments make mistakes and sometimes they
intentionally create measures that hurt foreigners. 41 8  That is the history of
international disputes. It is misguided reasoning to think that holding governments
accountable is a threat to democracy 
4 19
Overall, the Chapter 11 setup underscores the importance that NAFTA Parties
placed on foreign investment in drafting the NAFTA text. It encourages
compliance with international law, NAFTA and other international conventions in
411. See supra Part iI.B.I.
412. See supra note 271; United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, 89 B.C.L.R.
(3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 284, 14 B.L.R. (3d) 285, [2001] B.C.J. No. 950, 94-99 (Sup. Ct. Brit.
Col. 2001) (Doc. No. L002904).
413. See supra Part III.C.3.
414. See Feldman Award, supra note 291, IN 209-13.
415. Id. 171.
416. Id. 185.
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an effort to create a balanced regulatory structure within which to govern cross-
border investment. This is what is necessary for Mexico to realize its goals in
becoming more competitive in the international political economy It does not m
the meantime, moreover, prevent Mexico or any other NAFTA Party from
legislating for the protection of the public health and environment.
E. Neglects Notions of Equality and Sustainable Development
One commentator categorically disapproves of the inclusion of Chapter 11 in
NAFTA.42 ° Professor Alvarez argues against Chapter 11 dispute resolution
entirely, contending that its structure does not comport with ideas of equality and
sustainable development, and thus is harmful to Mexico. 421  He characterizes
Chapter 11 as "a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on steroids, the "most bizarre
human rights treaty ever conceived, and as "a human rights treaty for a special-
interest group. 422 He also asserts that Chapter 11 ignores "North/South power
differentials" and merely "reflects U.S. law and perspectives. ' 23 For Professor
Alvarez,
There is no actual symmetry of direct benefits to the national investors of all three
NAFTA parties--at least not for the foreseeable future. As few Mexican
investors are likely to be in the position to penetrate the U.S. market, it is almost
exclusively U.S., not Mexican, nationals that get the benefit of the investment
chapter.
424
Without a substantive commitment to investment rules applicable to all of
North America, the policy interests of countries m North America as expressed m
NAFTA to grow and integrate their economies would not have a chance of being
realized. Moreover, without foreign investment, Mexico cannot realize its goals
for economic growth. After years of opposition, Mexico believed it was necessary
to accept international norms as pillars for governing transnational business
activity in order to stimulate investment. In this respect, the contention that
Chapter 11 is the antithesis of sustainable development and thus derogatory to
human rights is something less than accurate.
First, although Chapter 11 provides broad substantive guarantees to NAFTA
investors, it is hardly accurate to characterize it as derogating from human rights in
420. See Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's
Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAIe INTER-AM. L. REV. 303 (1996); see also Jones, supra note 184, at 544-45
(discussing Professor Alvarez's arguments).
421. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 307; see also Jones, supra note 184, at 544-45 (discussing
Professor Alvarez); Sandrino, supra note 69, at 326 (arguing, also, against Chapter 11, adopting a
traditional developing world skepticism to foreign investment, stating "[t]he open investment regime in
NAFTA, with no provisions addressing either development objectives of the host state or TNC
operations, in essence places the state in a position in which its sovereignty and autonomy are
comprised").
422. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 304, 307-08.
423. Id. at312.
424. Id. at 304.
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Mexico. In negotiating Chapter 11, NAFTA Parties realized-including Mexico--
that investment is just as critical to economic growth and development as trade.
Investment, after all, is the impetus for long-term economic growth in any
economy. This is especially true for developing economies. Foreign investment is
necessary to promote the efficiency of investments m a particular market by
infusing that market with new ideas and new technology This in turn leads to, on
an aggregate scale, greater productivity greater profits, rising incomes and hence
rising standards of living. A treaty provision that has the intent to raise standards
of living m Mexico is certainly not derogatory to human rights.
As discussed earlier, foreign investment covering a wide variety of sectors in
Mexico continues to increase.425 Moreover, for as much as Chapter 11 does do to
stimulate investment in Mexico, its mandate is not to effect issues pertaining to the
redistribution of wealth in Mexican society, which is the real issue for sustainable
development. If the investment is not there in the first place, however, issues
regarding sustainable development are not even reached.426
Second, Professor Alvarez correctly notes that Mexico abandoned its
traditional policy by accepting Chapter 11, which is based on U.S. law
perspectives.427 But those perspectives happen to be in line with customary
international law practices. The historical reality and position in the international
political economy in which Mexico finds itself today illustrates that Mexico's
outright rejection of international law pertaining to foreign investment was perhaps
not the best course of action. Moreover, it is anti-progressive and borderline
senseless to suggest that Mexico should reject Chapter 11 standards simply
because they are in line with U.S. standards. Mexico has now, through a highly
technical treaty, correctly chosen to accept international norms regarding foreign
investment because that is what stimulates investment, and those standards are as
much a part of Mexico now as they are of the United States and Canada.
Third, there is no basis in asserting that Mexico will not or has not derived a
benefit from Chapter I I because Mexican investors have not "taken advantage" of
Chapter 1 1 dispute resolution. The point of Chapter 11 is to stimulate investment,
particularly in Mexico, and that should be the measure of Mexico's benefit. The
perceived benefit should not be measured as a tally card on how many Mexican-
based firms invest in the United States and Canada or on how many Mexican-
based firms have sued other NAFTA Parties under Chapter 11.
Fourth, the basic framework of Chapter 11 dispute resolution does not ignore
power imbalances between Mexico and other NAFTA Parties, as has been
suggested. In fact, it does just the opposite by establishing a neutral, rule-based
dispute resolution mechanism for investment disputes. In discussing the
differences between power-based diplomacy and rule-based diplomacy, Byrne
425. See supra notes 108-110.
426. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 309. Alvarez somewhat admits that his comparison of Chapter I I
to human rights is somewhat tangential, stating that "[i]t might be said that the comparison between the
NAFTA and human rights instruments is, in itself, rhetorical stance that is as questionable as the
NAFTA's invocation of 'equal rights' Id.
427. Id. at 312.
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astutely asserts that Chapter 11, as a rule-based regime, is more conducive to the
development of international law.428 This is especially advantageous for Mexico.
By removing foreign investment disputes to a neutral, international mechanism,
Mexico is not directly threatened by power-based political maneuvering by the
United States or Canada with regard to a given investment dispute.429
Under Chapter 11, there is no altering of the rules of the game in the middle
of an investment dispute to appease political demands adverse to Mexico's
position. In this setting, then, "Djiustice and fairness demand that Canada and the
United States live up to the same substantive rules and procedural mechanisms as
have been accepted by Mexico.' 430  This is essential for the development of
international law among NAFTA Parties and the rule of law in Mexico. And,
because the role of power politics is diminished in investment disputes, it provides
a framework within which Mexico can develop confidence in its decision to
abandon its traditional policy regarding foreign investment.
Disallowing private investors direct access to dispute resolution would further
exacerbate power differences between Mexico and the other NAFTA Parties, and
would represent a step backward for Mexico. Leaving investor-state disputes up to
NAFTA Parties for resolution "can be highly mefficient, arbitrary, and politically
explosive. 43' This would do nothing to encourage foreign investment in Mexico,
and it might in fact serve as a deterrent to such investment. Brower and Steven
stress that "[w]ith each new case commenced, the NAFTA countries will be
arguing their interpretations of international law and urging their views. [and]
will gain expertise through their regular participation in such proceedings., 43 2 This
is particularly important for Mexico, given its traditional stance on the applicability
of international law to foreign investment. This new practice, m and of itself, is
critical for Mexico's successful participation in an increasingly complex
international political economy
Thus, Chapter 11 dispute resolution does not ignore power differentials
between NAFTA Parties; rather, it successfully obfuscates those differentials by
offering a neutral, international body for dispute resolution.4 3 And, it is through
this framework that Mexico can participate in and experience the link between
international law and economic integration, which is imperative to Mexico's
participation in the international political economy and economic growth.
F Sovereignty in General
A note on the sovereignty argument in general is appropriate here. At base,
428. See Byme, supra note 333, at 419-20.
429. Id. at 429.
430. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 200.
431. Id. at 197.
432. Id. at 201. The authors underscore that this enables NAFTA Parties to influence and shape
investment policy in North America. Id. This gives Mexico an extraordinary opportunity to play its
hand in such development along with two developed countries.
433. Id. at 200.
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"[i]t is illogical for governments who have willingly incurred limits on their
sovereignty in order to respond to a perceived common threat to their international
competitiveness, to then argue against flexible private remedies on the basis of a
sovereignty argument., 434 Historical trends in integration in the Americas indicate
that countries in the Western Hemisphere have acknowledged a common interest
in establishing supranational frameworks in order to prosper economically, which,
in essence, is an effort to protect themselves. The economics of global capitalism
are in some ways outside the control of any particular country, and multilateral
frameworks represent governmental efforts to join the system and make it more
orderly for the benefit of their citizens.
Developing countries in the Americas, and in particular Mexico, have taken
bold steps to build the groundwork for multilateral governance. Mexico took a
more progressive step in agreeing to Chapter 11, acknowledging that in the world
of foreign investment, international standards are the best ways to guarantee fair
participation by itself and private investors in the investment dispute resolution
process.435 This in turn establishes a good environment for investment in Mexico,
which in turn enhances its prospects for prosperity. It is an action of protection-it
is a bold act of sovereignty that takes under consideration the realities of the age of
globalization.
Notably, an international arbitration tribunal with binding or even non-
binding authority serves as a "challenge" to traditional notions of sovereignty- but
the evolution of international law and the representations made by NAFTA Parties
seem to obscure the line between exercising sovereignty in an era of globalization
and maintaining sovereignty under archaic Westphalian conceptions of the
international system.436 Without international law and nation-states' concessions
to it economic integration, and more importantly progress, is impossible.
Elaborating on the purpose of Chapter 11, Brower and Steven have offered the
following insight:
434. Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 120; see also Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 7
("[A]II treaties, all international agreements are in a sense a compromise of sovereignty. However, they
are, first, an exercise of sovereignty.").
435. Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 85.
436. For good discussion on the changing notions of sovereignty today, see Ronald A. Brand,
Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System in the Twenty First Century,
25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279 (2002). Professor Brand notes the growing trends in
international economic law, wherein private parties are increasingly receiving more rights in the
international system. Id. at 290. Moreover, in discussing the historical origins of sovereignty and the
relationship between nation-states and individuals, he concludes, most correctly, that "[r[ecognition that
international law now limits the conduct of states in their relationships with individuals is not a bad
thing, nor does it necessarily represent diminution of the 'sovereignty' of states. Id. at 294. See also
Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 119:
In the future, there is likely to be less need for negotiations than for increasingly
effective means of enforcing compliance with existing interstate rules. Without efficient
means for private parties to secure enforcement of rules, such as those contained in
NAFTA, the credibility of such agreements is undermined. At a time when the power of
sovereign states to control transnational economic activity is at an all-time low, it seems
contradictory that private international actors lack the ability to enforce new rules that
are a direct response to this reality.
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In establishing this investment regime, the NAFTA Parties wanted to achieve
three main objectives: (1) to tear down existing foreign investment barriers by
eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions; (2) to build investor
confidence throughout the region through the elaboration and enforcement of clear
and fair rules; and (3) to 'depoliticize' the resolution of investment disputes by
eliminating the need for State-to-State adjudication. Any criticism of the Chapter
11 regime that fails to take account of these three factors is, literally, beside the
point.
437
The concerns with Chapter I I discussed herem in many ways do not take these
motives into account. They not only give cursory effect to the actual Chapter 11
text, but they also refuse to acknowledge the tremendous amount of investment
that continues to flow among NAFTA Parties, and into Mexico, beyond the realm
of politics. Chapter 11 has so far achieved NAFTA Parties' goals and after some
years of application, as discussed, Mexico is not any less sovereign.
The Chapter I I rule-based regime is also a lesser challenge to Mexico's
sovereignty, and all NAFTA Parties' sovereignty, by virtue of its structure.
Without the arbitration option, a NAFTA investor would be left with the options of
either litigating in foreign courts or pressuring the investor's home government to
use political channels to resolve the dispute. This, among other things, would not
serve as a catalyst to investment in Mexico. In this respect, international
arbitration may be viewed as the best means of preserving Mexico's sovereignty
for the time being. Given Mexico's historic stance on protecting its sovereignty
from outside influences, coupled with the reality of economic integration and the
importance of foreign investment to Mexico, the arbitration option is less intrusive
on Mexico's sovereignty than say, legal harmonization with its common law North
438American partners. Perhaps most importantly, from a Mexican standpoint
dealing with the litigious character of North American investors in general,
Byrne's comments may be appropriate: "one of the greatest attributes of the kind
of effective resolution that is provided by direct access is that 'it encourages
dispute avoidance. When potential disputants, whether they are party-nations or
private entities, can anticipate the uniformity with which the law will be applied,
they will be less likely to 'break the rules. ,,
439
Lastly, taken as a whole, the Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico so far
represent Mexico's participation in the development of iternational law while it
reaps the benefits of increased investment and enjoys a more equal footing with
other NAFTA Parties. Metalclad and Feldman represent good examples of when
and to what extent awards against a Party are appropriate, and further provide
guidelines for Mexican regulation with respect to foreign investment. On the other
side, Azinian and Waste Management demonstrate that Mexico will prevail when
investors' claims are either unsubstantiated or when investors do not follow the
proper rules for resolving investor-state disputes. Rather than a detriment to
national sovereignty and democratic governance in Mexico, an informed
437 Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 195 (footnotes omitted).
438. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
439. Byme, supra note 333, at 429.
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discussion of the Chapter 11 and its application reveal that the system as is has
been successful m balancing Mexico's economic goals, historical political realities
and the reality of international law in economic integration.
V CONCLUSION: A HEALTHY MIX
Historical policy interests in the Western Hemisphere have placed the
Americas on a path toward economic integration. Modem trade and investment
agreements are the main tools for governance of such integration, and they serve to
fuel dramatic increases in cross-border business transactions and to create an
environment in which the intersection of international law, economics and politics
is a reality Such integration creates the need for effective dispute resolution
procedures, and this is especially the case with regard to disputes involving private
investors and countries under trade and investment agreements. Investment is just
as important as trade for deeper economic integration, and foreign investment is
critical for growth in developing countries. And, it entails the interaction of
private economic actors with sovereign entities in a way that begs adherence to
objective, international norms.
International arbitration has emerged as a preferred method for international
dispute settlement, and as an alternative to transnational litigation and diplomatic
pressure it provides a sound, manageable framework for dispute resolution. It does
so without forcing countries to engage in the monumental task of legal
harmonization. This allows international law and economics to progress side-by-
side.
NAFTA is a prime example of integration trends in the Americas. The
Chapter 11 framework represents a historic, positive step by NAFTA Parties to
grow and develop together and collectively aid in the development of international
law. The significant changes made by Mexico to conform to Chapter 11, together
with the Chapter 11 arbitrations involving Mexico thus far, serve as major stepping
stones for the developed Mexico of tomorrow. Notably, some commentators offer
potentially useful suggestions for future modification of Chapter 11 dispute
resolution. However, although some concerns regarding Chapter 11 raise
important questions regarding, for instance, appellate review, transparency and
sustainable development, the record does not evince that Chapter I I is detrimental
to Mexico--or even to all Parties for that matter.
The broader criticisms that Chapter 11 Is a threat to national sovereignty and
an abrogation of democracy are unfounded. With respect to Mexico, this is
supported by both a close look at the NAFTA text as well as the arbitrations
involving Mexico so far. Rather, direct access dispute resolution, as an
international law-based framework for investment dispute resolution, is an impetus
for progression in Mexican law and a catalyst for increased investment in Mexico.
It is also a platform for political equilibrium between Mexico and other NAFTA
Parties. Indeed, Chapter 11 direct access dispute resolution is a healthy mix of
international law, economics and politics for Mexico, and it is but one necessary
tool for Mexico's successful participation in the international political economy.
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